Philosophy of Science

Proof Paradoxes: An Analysis of Thomson's Argument and Redmayne’s Objection

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

Mohammad Reza Hezareh 1
Mohammad Reza Hezareh 2

1 MA graduate in Philosophy of Science, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran

2 Assistant Professor of Science and Technology Studies Group, Department of Management, Science and Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

10.30465/ps.2026.52906.1800
Abstract
Proof paradoxes refer to situations where naked statistical evidence supports the conviction of a defendant, yet the resulting judgment appears counterintuitive when considered solely from this evidence. The prevailing approach to addressing proof paradoxes involves distinguishing naked statistical evidence from other types of evidence. In this framework, Thomson (1986) proposes that the existence of a causal relationship between the evidence and its source can serve as a criterion for this distinction. Conversely, Redmayne (2008) contends that Thomson's proposal is unhelpful, arguing that even with naked statistical evidence, a causal relationship can be established in accordance with Thomson's view. In this study, we demonstrate that, by leveraging Pollock's nomic probability theory and Woodward's causal model, Thomson's proposed criterion can be refined to effectively address Redmayne's criticisms.

Keywords

Pollock's Nomic probability
Woodward's causal model
Thomson
Redmayne
Proof Paradoxes
Statistical evidence

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