Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

• Saeedeh ُShahmir ¹
• Abdollah Nasri ²

¹ PhD student

² Full Professor of Allameh Tabataba’i University (ATU)

Abstract

This paper seeks to provide a clear account of the problem of primary and secondary qualities in Descartes’ philosophy. Alongside his other metaphysical claims, Descartes acknowledges three substances—mind, God, and matter—and maintains that material substance possesses only one essential attribute, namely extension. In his view, everything that exists is composed of particles of matter, and these particles are defined by specific geometrical properties such as size, motion, and shape. Descartes designates these properties as the “real qualities” of matter. While his conception of “primary or real qualities” is relatively explicit and unambiguous, such clarity does not extend to his treatment of secondary qualities. Consequently, some commentators have interpreted Descartes as an anti-realist regarding secondary qualities. This article aims to examine Descartes’ account of qualities and his opposition to scholastic philosophy, while also discussing the different interpretations of his position on secondary qualities, ranging from moderate to anti-realist readings. Ultimately, it defends Descartes as a realist, particularly in light of Locke’s approach to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Keywords

• Primary qualities
• Secondary qualities
• Mechanism
• Realism
• Anti-realism