The debate over FREE WILL is among the oldest and most fundamental challenges in philosophy, reaching a peak in the eighteenth century, particularly in the works of David Hume. This article, entitled “Reimagining the Debate on FREE WILL: From the Eighteenth Century to Contemporary Cognitive Science” seeks to reinterpret this confrontation between FREEDOM and necessity in the light of current findings in cognitive science and neuroscience. The central question is whether recent empirical research — such as studies on decision-making, action prediction, and mental causation — can support or undermine the possibility of FREEDOM OF WILL.
The main thesis is that Hume’s compatibilist framework, emphasizing the harmony between causal necessity and the human capacity to act on reasons, still provides a crucial resource for addressing contemporary scientific debates. The method is analytical–comparative: on the one hand, the concepts and arguments of Hume and other eighteenth-century thinkers are examined; on the other, these ideas are revisited in light of cognitive science and neuroscience.
The findings indicate that a compatibilist reading of FREEDOM OF WILL remains resilient to empirical challenges and can help reconceptualize notions of necessity, control, and moral responsibility within the dialogue between philosophy and science. Thus, the long-standing debate does not end but instead opens new horizons in the context of contemporary sciences.