Hadi Samadi; Bahar Manbachi
Abstract
While the significance of beauty and symmetry in science has been a recurring theme in the discourse of many eminent scientists, the philosophical contemplation of aesthetics within the philosophy of science has garnered attention only in recent years. This paper examines the perspectives of renowned ...
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While the significance of beauty and symmetry in science has been a recurring theme in the discourse of many eminent scientists, the philosophical contemplation of aesthetics within the philosophy of science has garnered attention only in recent years. This paper examines the perspectives of renowned scientists on the role of beauty and symmetry, revealing a spectrum of views where beauty is variously seen as a hallmark of truth or regarded with skepticism. We propose a psychological explanation for the scientific preoccupation with beauty and symmetry, suggesting that the human ability to recognize facial symmetry is an evolutionary adaptation. This adaptation's byproduct, we argue, is the inclination to appreciate symmetry in domains beyond the original adaptive purpose. Furthermore, the paper explores how portraiture often deviates from biological standards of beauty, indicating a potential to transcend biological predispositions. The final assertion posits that while the pursuit of beauty and symmetry can drive scientific inquiry, it may also impede the attainment of truth. Drawing parallels with artists who have transcended their biological inclinations, we suggest that scientists, too, might overcome these aesthetic biases.
seyedmostafa shahraeini; mojtaba jalili
Abstract
At first, it seems that in Cartesian science which seeks to master the world based on its rationalistic and ontological foundations, there is no room for hypothesis of any kind; because whatever appears before the modern reason, is so clear that needs not to any assumption. This view is both correct ...
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At first, it seems that in Cartesian science which seeks to master the world based on its rationalistic and ontological foundations, there is no room for hypothesis of any kind; because whatever appears before the modern reason, is so clear that needs not to any assumption. This view is both correct and incorrect. The Cartesian tree of knowledge has three parts within first two parts of which, i. e. metaphysics as its root and physics as its trunk, only reason is absolute sovereign, while its third part, i. e. the triad branches including medicine, mechanics, and morals cannot be established without hypotheses. The main role of hypothesis is making this tree to be fruitful in its three branches. Experience as the phase of fruit-gathering from this tree is impossible without hypothesis, and this is the very turning-point of which Descartes speaks as his practical philosophy which “makes us the lords and masters of the world”. Hypothesis, as the linkage between reason and experience, is of so irreplaceable role without which Cartesian scientist cannot be successful in bridging the gap between reason, from one hand, and sensation and imagination, from the other.
Seyed Esmaiel Masoudi; Seyed Saied Zahed Zahedani
Volume 8, Issue 15 , September 2018, , Pages 81-108
Abstract
Objectivity, as the ideal of science, especially human science, is criticized by Gadamer because it constructs an alienated experiment in human and causes an ontological obstruction. This ideal stems from the superiority of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on modern science and also negligence of language ...
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Objectivity, as the ideal of science, especially human science, is criticized by Gadamer because it constructs an alienated experiment in human and causes an ontological obstruction. This ideal stems from the superiority of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on modern science and also negligence of language by Western philosophical tradition. Although Dilthey attempted to provide a special place for human science using linguistic and hermeneutics tradition, due to his Cartesian foundations, and his instrumentalist attitude toward historical language and consciousness, he suffered from subjectivism and considered human science truth-less as Kantian aesthetic judgment. Rereading artistic experience and historical experience in Kant and Dilthey, and using Heidegger’s and Hegel's philosophy and also attending to the ontology of language, Gadamer organized hermeneutic experience so that its ideal is not objectification process, but the emergence of the subject itself in the language, and this is Sachlichkeit that is the disclosure of the subjectivity of subject or the objectivity of object.
