Max Weber's methodology, influenced by the Southwest Neo-Kantian school, emphasizes the distinction between natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft) and cultural sciences (Kulturwissenschaft). This distinction also relates to the general approach of interpretivists, who differentiate between the human sciences by understanding the meaning of human actions and the natural sciences by explaining them through causal laws. However, Weber used the words "causality" and "causal analysis" for his sociological analysis, and since explanation (in the most common definition) means the expression of cause, the idea has been created that Weber's method in cultural sciences has become more similar to the natural sciences through his focus on causal analysis.
In this article, we argue that Weber’s form of causal analysis remains committed to the Neo-Kantian distinction between the cultural sciences and the natural sciences. To support this, after describing Weber's methodology and causal approach, and comparing Weber's account with other philosophers who have offered interpretations of singular causation (e.g., David Lewis), we will demonstrate that the analysis of singular causation has features that can still uphold Weber’s distinction between the natural sciences and the cultural sciences. Finally, we aim to provide a criterion for differentiating these two types of science based on Weber's perspective.