Ramin Kazemi; Mohammad Raayat Jahromi; Javid Kazemi
Abstract
The subjective interpretation, as one of the four conventional interpretations of the philosophy of probability, was introduced by Frank Ramsey and Bruno De Finetti to overcome some problems of Bayesianism. This interpretation has fans today and is of interest to many Bayesians. The epistemological feature ...
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The subjective interpretation, as one of the four conventional interpretations of the philosophy of probability, was introduced by Frank Ramsey and Bruno De Finetti to overcome some problems of Bayesianism. This interpretation has fans today and is of interest to many Bayesians. The epistemological feature of the Bayesian framework is subjective trust (or credence). The purpose of this article is to further investigate the subjective interpretation of the philosophy of probability, from the perspective of the tension between probabilistic cognition and non-probabilistic perception. The meaning of probabilistic cognition is knowledge based on mathematical relationships and especially the Bayesian formula, which provides the level of certainty of an event by using credits (degrees of belief). On the other hand, non-probability perception is the result of individual interpretations or any other type of probability assignment without considering the mathematics of probability. The investigations will show that this tension is real, and the solution presented in this article is that in predicting events based on subjective interpretation, non-probability perception cannot be ignored.
Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht; amir ehsan karbasizade
Volume 8, Issue 16 , March 2019, , Pages 19-41
Abstract
The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem ...
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The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem and trying to dissolve it in one way or another). Classical solutions have been proposed by Garber, Jeffery, and Niiniluoto, and have been criticized by many, among them, Eells and Earman. One of the non-classical solutions is to choose an objective (rather than Bayesian’s subjective) interpretation of probability; this view has been proposed by Rosenkrantz. In this paper, we thoroughly examine the classical solutions and objections that have been raised against them, trying to show that the classical approach is deficient. In the end, we try to make a case for Rosenkrantz’s proposal as the only solution which, we believe, gets to the root of the problem correctly
lotfolah nabavi; Nima Ahmadi; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
Volume 3, Issue 5 , September 2013, , Pages 99-118
Abstract
Bayesians believe that they have solved a significant problem in philosophy of science, which is the identification of the logic which governs evidences. The problem has special importance to philosophy of science, because what eventually distinguishes science from myth is that we have good evidence ...
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Bayesians believe that they have solved a significant problem in philosophy of science, which is the identification of the logic which governs evidences. The problem has special importance to philosophy of science, because what eventually distinguishes science from myth is that we have good evidence for the content of science. The core ideas of all versions of Bayesian confirmation theory are that the beliefs are confirmed to a probability measure, and incorporating new evidence is done through conditionalization using Bayes’ rule. Bayesians believe that qualitative approaches to confirmation theory are hopeless; an adequate account of the way evidences support hypotheses and theories must be quantitative, and a quantitative account implicates utilizing the probability calculus. The aim of this paper is to investigate the challenges to confirmation theory by means of the standard Bayesian approach.
