seyedmostafa shahraeini; mojtaba jalili
Abstract
At first, it seems that in Cartesian science which seeks to master the world based on its rationalistic and ontological foundations, there is no room for hypothesis of any kind; because whatever appears before the modern reason, is so clear that needs not to any assumption. This view is both correct ...
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At first, it seems that in Cartesian science which seeks to master the world based on its rationalistic and ontological foundations, there is no room for hypothesis of any kind; because whatever appears before the modern reason, is so clear that needs not to any assumption. This view is both correct and incorrect. The Cartesian tree of knowledge has three parts within first two parts of which, i. e. metaphysics as its root and physics as its trunk, only reason is absolute sovereign, while its third part, i. e. the triad branches including medicine, mechanics, and morals cannot be established without hypotheses. The main role of hypothesis is making this tree to be fruitful in its three branches. Experience as the phase of fruit-gathering from this tree is impossible without hypothesis, and this is the very turning-point of which Descartes speaks as his practical philosophy which “makes us the lords and masters of the world”. Hypothesis, as the linkage between reason and experience, is of so irreplaceable role without which Cartesian scientist cannot be successful in bridging the gap between reason, from one hand, and sensation and imagination, from the other.
Abdolhamid Mohammadi; Ali Paya
Abstract
The later Wittgenstein presents all types of knowledge claims in the context of language games. He also maintains that no language game is possible without certainty. Certainty lies outside of language games, but the very existence of any kind of language game depends on it. In his view, even "the game ...
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The later Wittgenstein presents all types of knowledge claims in the context of language games. He also maintains that no language game is possible without certainty. Certainty lies outside of language games, but the very existence of any kind of language game depends on it. In his view, even "the game of doubting presupposes certainty". According to Wittgenstein, certainty, as well as absolute doubt and absolute knowledge are meaningless. But relative doubt, or as he calls it, "reasonable doubt", is meaningful and can produce its own language game. The language game of doubting, like other language games, is based on what Wittgenstein dubs a set of "world-picture" or a system of "hinge propositions". In Wittgenstein's opinion, ‘hinge propositions’ are based on people’s lived experiences and their collective agreements over them. ‘Hinge propositions,’ in this sense, are objective, and although he refers to them as ‘propositions’, they are not propositions in the usual sense of this term: they do not partake in reasoning and arguments but the discourses of causes (and their effects). In this article, we first discuss the characteristics of relative doubt and the rules of the language game of doubt, as well as the characteristics of certainty and the system of ‘hinge propositions’. We then move on to a critical assessment of Wittgenstein’s views on the above topics by highlighting some internal inconsistencies in his arguments and exposing some shortcomings in his views through the prism of Critical Rationalism.
Fatemeh Farhanian; Mohammad Ali Abdollahi
Volume 2, Issue 3 , September 2012, , Pages 93-114
Abstract
The dilemma of induction is one of the most difficult philosophical problems that if solved many philosophical problems could be explained and many conclusions could scientifically be justifiable. Bertrand Russell, one of the greatest analyzer philosophers of the twentieth century, has tried to solve ...
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The dilemma of induction is one of the most difficult philosophical problems that if solved many philosophical problems could be explained and many conclusions could scientifically be justifiable. Bertrand Russell, one of the greatest analyzer philosophers of the twentieth century, has tried to solve the problem of induction.
From the Russell’s point of view the dilemma of induction is a question of how to justify the general provisions, causal laws, and indirect knowledge. He appealed that the principle of uniformity of nature is not enough to solve this problem, and then he suggested the reception of induction as a principle. Based on the principle of induction, the more the number of concurrences of A and B the greater is the possibility of perpetual coincidence between them and when the number of concurrences is enough constant conjunction of A with B is almost certain.
According to Russell, the principle of induction is neither rationally provable nor empirically verifiable, but the principle should be accepted because of its natural evidence and finally because of its consequences. According to Russell the metalogical principles cause the probability of generalization lean toward certainty. Finally he notes although induction can’t provide us with theoretical certainty (logical and mathematical) but its near certainty probability is more than that of a metaphysical dogma.
