lotfolah nabavi; Nima Ahmadi; Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
Volume 3, Issue 5 , September 2013, , Pages 99-118
Abstract
Bayesians believe that they have solved a significant problem in philosophy of science, which is the identification of the logic which governs evidences. The problem has special importance to philosophy of science, because what eventually distinguishes science from myth is that we have good evidence ...
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Bayesians believe that they have solved a significant problem in philosophy of science, which is the identification of the logic which governs evidences. The problem has special importance to philosophy of science, because what eventually distinguishes science from myth is that we have good evidence for the content of science. The core ideas of all versions of Bayesian confirmation theory are that the beliefs are confirmed to a probability measure, and incorporating new evidence is done through conditionalization using Bayes’ rule. Bayesians believe that qualitative approaches to confirmation theory are hopeless; an adequate account of the way evidences support hypotheses and theories must be quantitative, and a quantitative account implicates utilizing the probability calculus. The aim of this paper is to investigate the challenges to confirmation theory by means of the standard Bayesian approach.
Fatemeh Farhanian; Mohammad Ali Abdollahi
Volume 2, Issue 3 , September 2012, , Pages 93-114
Abstract
The dilemma of induction is one of the most difficult philosophical problems that if solved many philosophical problems could be explained and many conclusions could scientifically be justifiable. Bertrand Russell, one of the greatest analyzer philosophers of the twentieth century, has tried to solve ...
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The dilemma of induction is one of the most difficult philosophical problems that if solved many philosophical problems could be explained and many conclusions could scientifically be justifiable. Bertrand Russell, one of the greatest analyzer philosophers of the twentieth century, has tried to solve the problem of induction.
From the Russell’s point of view the dilemma of induction is a question of how to justify the general provisions, causal laws, and indirect knowledge. He appealed that the principle of uniformity of nature is not enough to solve this problem, and then he suggested the reception of induction as a principle. Based on the principle of induction, the more the number of concurrences of A and B the greater is the possibility of perpetual coincidence between them and when the number of concurrences is enough constant conjunction of A with B is almost certain.
According to Russell, the principle of induction is neither rationally provable nor empirically verifiable, but the principle should be accepted because of its natural evidence and finally because of its consequences. According to Russell the metalogical principles cause the probability of generalization lean toward certainty. Finally he notes although induction can’t provide us with theoretical certainty (logical and mathematical) but its near certainty probability is more than that of a metaphysical dogma.
