An Objection to Paul’s Reading on Christianity
Jalal
Peykani
Assistant Professor in Theology, Payamenoor University
author
text
article
2013
per
The classical problem of induction is one of the very known forms of Skepticism, which many philosophers have tried to solve or resolve it. Some epistemologists believe that Externalism could be used as a good approach to resolve the problem. They claim that ‘Process reliabilism’, the most important externalist theory, is less vulnerable to Skepticism than other theories, because of its epistemological fallibilism, and also taking modest and weak criteria to acquire knowledge. In this paper we will argue that externalist theories, including Process reliabilism, presuppose induction, so such theories don’t have considerable capabilities to solve or resolve the problem.
Philosophy of Science
IHCS
2383-0722
3
v.
5
no.
2013
1
21
https://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_881_83804bf106ad08afdd6987c63da0490c.pdf
Kroon on Reference VS Davidson on Content
Morteza
Sedaghat Ahangari Hossein Zadeh
Assistant Professor in Philosophy of Science, Amirkabir University of Technology
author
text
article
2013
per
Kroon believes that causal relation alone does not determine the referent of a name because causation involves a kind of under-determination to escape of which, Kroon embed a cognitive dimension, which he calls epistemic warrant, in reference-determination. Davidson brings similar words in his triangulation thesis in order to determine the content of a perceptual belief. He argues that, in addition to causal relation, one takes benefit of linguistic communications with others in order to determine the content of his perceptual belief which is the cause of that belief. In this paper, having brought the theses of Kroon and Davidson respectively, I enumerate a number of similarities between Kroon’s epistemic warrant and Davidson’s linguistic communications.
Philosophy of Science
IHCS
2383-0722
3
v.
5
no.
2013
23
33
https://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_882_d6b54f74c05c2b3d0d5f1e932d6e1d21.pdf
The Five-Stage Development of Philosophy
of Science in 20th Century
Mohammad Reaz
Abdollahnejad
استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه تبریز
author
text
article
2013
per
The main activities of Philosophy of science, as a branch of philosophy, has been began since the last decade of 19th century, in the wake of some experimental scientists' attempts to establish new non-metaphysical foundations for inductive empirical sciences. The very notable point is that the nature of philosophy of science has not formed and developed in one, but in five stages. In this paper I will illustrate the five-stage formation and development of philosophy of science in 20th century in order to draw some the results from it. These five stages are: 1. Sprouting stage (1890-1918): the characteristic of this stage is the reconstruction of Newtonian physics by means of Mach’s instrumentalism, Poincare’s conventionalism and Duhem’s modified falsificationism. 2. Evolvement stage (1918-1935): in this stage, three pillars of logical positivism (reductionism, analytic-synthetic distinction, and verificationism) set the stage for logical reconstruction of science. 3. The classical stage (1935-1970): in which the logical reconstruction of science is accomplished by Popper’s and some logical positivist’s revisions of the pillars. 4. The Historicism stage (1960-1985): in this stage, some philosophers, especially Feyerabend and Kuhn based on the history of science, criticize and challenge the main principles of the previous stages. 5. The modelistic stage (1970-2000): in which through increasing the pragmatic and semantic tendencies in science, ‘theory’ is replaced by ‘model’.
Philosophy of Science
IHCS
2383-0722
3
v.
5
no.
2013
35
56
https://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_883_80b4169c6fe4547dbc86eb4b96d140d4.pdf
Comparative Examination of Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociology of Science and Actor-Network Theory
Mahnaz
Farahmand
Assistant Professor in Sociology, Yazd University
author
text
article
2013
per
This paper is allocated to analyze the key concepts of Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of science and Actor- Network Theory. Through considering the concepts of field, capital, and symbolic capital, Bourdieu regards the circumstances of science production. He draw this strategy from his first argument on the competition between science supporters and claimants over capital. Through criticizing Actor- Network theory, which nullifies the distinctions between human and non human actors, he portrays a comprehensive picture of the new sociology of science’s irregularities. However, the actor-network theory accuses the Bourdieu ideas to have classical sociology of science’s defects. In this paper through a comparative examination of the two approaches’ theoretical dimensions from various aspects, we will specify their basic and conceptual distinctions.
Philosophy of Science
IHCS
2383-0722
3
v.
5
no.
2013
57
71
https://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_884_90df4b24a9a9e13d30e064a9d1893479.pdf
Logicism in Mathematics: from Bolzano to Russell
Gholamhossein
Moghadam Heidari
Assistant Professor in Philosophy of Science and Technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies,
author
text
article
2013
per
Logicism is one of the important schools in philosophy of mathematics which reduce the concepts and propositions of mathematics into the concepts and propositions of logic. Bolzano was the pioneer mathematician who based mathematics on logic, and then Ferege continued this project through propounding a new version of logic. Ultimately, in the early decades of 20th century, this project was finalized by Russel and Withead. In this paper, I, attempt to review the historical development of logicism from Bolzano to Russel, and then through the examination of strengths and weaknesses of the project, I try to answer to this question: has logicism been satisfactory?
Philosophy of Science
IHCS
2383-0722
3
v.
5
no.
2013
73
97
https://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_885_d352e1431074747572c287070762b7c7.pdf
Bayesianism and Challenges to Confirmation Theory
lotfolah
nabavi
Associate Professor in Philosophy, Tarbiat Madras University
author
Nima
Ahmadi
Ph.D Student in Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University
author
Seyyed Mohammad Ali
Hodjati
Associate Professor in Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University
author
text
article
2013
per
Bayesians believe that they have solved a significant problem in philosophy of science, which is the identification of the logic which governs evidences. The problem has special importance to philosophy of science, because what eventually distinguishes science from myth is that we have good evidence for the content of science. The core ideas of all versions of Bayesian confirmation theory are that the beliefs are confirmed to a probability measure, and incorporating new evidence is done through conditionalization using Bayes’ rule. Bayesians believe that qualitative approaches to confirmation theory are hopeless; an adequate account of the way evidences support hypotheses and theories must be quantitative, and a quantitative account implicates utilizing the probability calculus. The aim of this paper is to investigate the challenges to confirmation theory by means of the standard Bayesian approach.
Philosophy of Science
IHCS
2383-0722
3
v.
5
no.
2013
99
118
https://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_886_ae25e735465ae49c35ce221c5f50ebed.pdf