Philosophy of Science

Abstract Drawing on Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance, Christian List advances a pragmatist framework according to which any system—human or artificial—that satisfies three macro-level conditions—intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control—may be ascribed free will, even in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. Employing conceptual analysis and engaging with prominent critiques in the philosophical literature—including Robert Kane’s account of the origination problem, Nancey Murphy and Warren Brown’s critiques of downward causation and emergence, and empirical findings by Eddy Nahmias on the role of P. F. Strawson’s reactive attitudes in free will ascription—this paper argues that List’s framework suffers from a structural ambiguity in distinguishing between “functional autonomy” and “responsibility-grounding free will.” Reducing free will to mere “explanatory sufficiency” not only results in conceptual inflation but also opens the door to “algorithmic responsibility evasion,” whereby developers and institutions may deflect accountability by appealing to the system’s agency. In response, the paper proposes a three-level framework that distinguishes functional autonomy (Level 1), robust free will (Level 2), and moral responsibility (Level 3), and introduces a threshold condition for robust free will: the capacity to revise one’s ultimate ends in light of evaluative commitments. This condition presupposes phenomenal consciousness and P. F. Strawson-style reactive attitudes, thereby clarifying why no contemporary artificial system—even the most advanced language models—possesses robust free will. By resolving the ambiguity in List’s account, the proposed distinction carries important normative implications for AI ethics, legal responsibility, and technology policy.

Abstract This research offers a critical analysis of Scientism as an epistemological stance in which science is elevated from a means of understanding nature to the ultimate criterion of all truth. The central problem is that scientism, by extending beyond the methodological limits of the empirical sciences, claims epistemic exclusivity and fundamentally calls into question the domains of metaphysics, ethics, religion, and the humanities. The article’s main finding is that scientism is realized at three levels: (1) scientific naturalism, which reduces reality to observable nature; (2) methodological exclusivism, which regards only the method of the natural sciences as valid for acquiring knowledge; and (3) scientific Imperialism, which sees science as the sole authority capable of answering all human questions. It is shown that these levels rest on three pillars: reductionism(reducing complex phenomena to physical components), Darwinism (biological explanation of all behaviors and beliefs), and the naturalization of normativity (reducing ethics and values to evolutionary processes). The study further shows that the consequences of scientism are chain-like: it begins with the denial of metaphysics and theology, leads to the erosion of the foundations of normative ethics, and ultimately ends in the denial of human distinctiveness from nature and the collapse of the humanities. In the end, the article’s key conclusion is that scientism is not merely an epistemological error, but a path from the denial of God to the denial of human beings—a trajectory that threatens the philosophical, ethical, and anthropological foundations of civilization.

Abstract Proof paradoxes refer to situations where naked statistical evidence supports the conviction of a defendant, yet the resulting judgment appears counterintuitive when considered solely from this evidence. The prevailing approach to addressing proof paradoxes involves distinguishing naked statistical evidence from other types of evidence. In this framework, Thomson (1986) proposes that the existence of a causal relationship between the evidence and its source can serve as a criterion for this distinction. Conversely, Redmayne (2008) contends that Thomson's proposal is unhelpful, arguing that even with naked statistical evidence, a causal relationship can be established in accordance with Thomson's view. In this study, we demonstrate that, by leveraging Pollock's nomic probability theory and Woodward's causal model, Thomson's proposed criterion can be refined to effectively address Redmayne's criticisms.

Abstract In the history of modern psychology, Freud appears as a thinker who stands at the point of rupture between philosophy and Kantian science, a point at which the Cartesian conscious subject could no longer be the bearer of the whole truth. This article argues that Freud’s turn from consciousness to the unconscious, rather than being a mere shift of focus from the conscious to the unconscious, is a response to the internal crisis of a psychology of consciousness and to the critique of the doctrine that identifies consciousness with the mental. This turn is deeply intertwined with Freud’s engagement with the German tradition (from Leibniz to Nietzsche) and with the physiological concepts of the Helmholtzian school.
Using a historical-philosophical method and drawing on Freud’s primary texts and related sources, the paper shows that the Freudian unconscious is neither a return to a metaphysical “soul” nor a reduction of the psyche to biological mechanisms but is instead conceived through the gaps and dysfunctions of consciousness, thereby transforming the very object of psychological science. It concludes that Freudian psychoanalysis should be understood as a radical alternative to a psychology of consciousness—one that is situated between philosophy and physiology, grounded in clinical experience and the analysis of the failures of consciousness, and that thereby makes possible a science of the unconscious.

Abstract For the ancients, the Euclidean axiom system was a desirable model for deductive system building. Avicenna used this model to construct a metaphysical propositional system. However, some have ruled out the possibility of constructing such a system for metaphysics and have considered the attempt to construct such a system to be a mistake. The issue that this article has tackled is posed in the form of the question of how and under what possibility did Avicenna construct a deductive propositional system for metaphysics? This issue is of great importance and necessity in that it questions the conditions of possibility of the first deductive propositional system of metaphysics. In order to answer this question, the present article first examines the structure of the propositional system of Avicenna's metaphysics with regard to its "components" and "order" in a descriptive-analytical manner, and then searches for the possible conditions for its realization. According to Avicenna's scientology, metaphysics based on the lemma method should only use conventional principles. However, metaphysics based on the immediate method also has the possibility of using axioms. According to Avicenna, metaphysics using the lemma method is possible in itself, but difficult in practice. This difficulty, on the one hand, and educational purposes, on the other hand, have caused Avicenna to resort to the immediate method in addition to the lemma method; and thus, to form a "conventional principle-subjective principle" structure. The results of the article show that the structuring of Avicenna's propositional system of metaphysics is possible only within the combined framework of these two methods. And this combination is also possible based on the theory of issuance in ontology and the theory of knowledge in Ibn Sina's epistemology.

Abstract This article offers an exposition of McTaggart’s paradox and examines several influential interpretations of it. Its principal aim is to reconsider the argument of John Ellis McTaggart, the prominent early twentieth-century metaphysician, for the unreality of time as articulated through a fundamental opposition between two ideas: “absolute reality” and “tensed reality,” and to draw from this opposition a number of conclusions relevant to contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature of time. To this end, it reconstructs, with close attention to McTaggart’s own formulation, the structure of his argument—an argument intended to demonstrate that time involves a contradiction and therefore cannot be real. It then analyzes and assesses several alternative interpretations of the paradox: Heather Dyke’s account of the contradiction of tense, Huw Price’s view regarding the tension between inclusivity and exclusivity, and, most notably, Michael Dummett’s interpretation. Dummett maintains that the success of McTaggart’s paradox depends upon the acceptance of a substantive philosophical presupposition, namely, that a complete description of reality is, in principle, possible. Finally, the article argues that understanding McTaggart’s paradox within this framework has significant implications for assessing the legitimacy of the philosophical dispute between the A-theory and the B-theory of time. In particular, appeals to naturalistic arguments—that is, those invoking physical theories—in support of the B-theory rely upon a specific philosophical presupposition concerning the possibility of an absolute description of reality and are therefore vulnerable to the charge of begging the question.

Abstract There exists a significant conceptual distinction between science and technology. This article examines the philosophical grounds underlying the conflation of science and technology. It suggests that treating the two as identical is not merely an epistemological confusion; rather, it may lead to a range of undesirable theoretical and practical consequences. From an epistemological perspective, the paper also argues, the notion of 'applied science' may be regarded as redundant, as it falls within the category of technology.