Philosophy of Science

Abstract The study of the certainty and inexorability of mathematical theorems is one of the important topics in the philosophy of mathematics. Various schools such as logicism, intuitionism, Platonism and naturalism have tried to present theories on this subject. These schools usually seek the foundation for mathematics in order to justify the certainty of mathematical theorems and logic. This has always been accompanied by numerous failures. In this article, we try to examine this issue from Wittgenstein's point of view. That is, instead of asking "What is the foundation of logic and mathematics?" we ask "Why does mathematics need the foundation?". Therefore, we first examine foundationalism. Then we show that mathematics is a language-game. In this regard, we examine geometry and logic as two language-games in mathematics. Finally, we show that, according to Wittgenstein's philosophy, the certainty and inexorability of a valid inference or a correct calculation comes from the practical procedure of inference and calculation. Keywords Wittgenstein, practice, philosophy of mathematics, language-game, foundationalism Extended Abstract 1. Introduction The question “Where does the certainty of logical and mathematical propositions come from?” has been the central preoccupation of the philosophy of mathematics. Logicism (Frege, Russell) sought to reduce mathematics to logic, thereby grounding its certainty in the apparent indubitability of logical truths. Intuitionism (Brouwer) located the foundation in basic mental constructions, arguing that mathematical objects are products of intuitive temporal processes. Platonism posits a mind‑independent realm of abstract entities, making mathematical truth a matter of discovery rather than invention. Naturalism treats mathematics as continuous with empirical science, justifying its claims through their overall role in successful theories. Despite their differences, these schools share a foundationalist assumption: that the certainty of mathematics must be justified by appealing to a privileged class of basic, self‑evident beliefs or entities. However, as we show, each programme faces insurmountable difficulties—regress problems, circularity, or the inability to account for the actual practices of mathematicians. This paper, therefore, proposes a radical shift: instead of seeking a foundation, we investigate why mathematics is thought to need one. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, we argue that the search for a foundation is itself a grammatical misunderstanding. Mathematics, like any language‑game, is not a structure built upon a base; it is an activity embedded in our form of life. Its certainty is not derived from something external but is exhibited in the way we use its rules. Our aim is to articulate this practice‑based view and to show how it resolves the puzzle of mathematical necessity without metaphysical commitments. 2. Materials and Methods This study is a philosophical analysis, not an empirical experiment. Our method consists of a critical reinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s later works, primarily Philosophical Investigations, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, and On Certainty, combined with a historical and comparative examination of foundationalist projects. We adopt the following conceptual tools: · Language‑game: we treat mathematics as a multiplicity of language‑games, each with its own vocabulary and rules. A language‑game is a rule‑governed activity that is learned and practiced in a community. · Rule‑following: we analyse the notion that obeying a rule is a practice. A rule cannot be a private mental object; it is publicly taught, learned, and applied in repeated situations. · Grammar: we distinguish between empirical propositions (which can be true or false) and grammatical rules (which determine what counts as a meaningful statement and what counts as a valid inference). Questions about the truth of rules are category mistakes. To illustrate our method, we examine two case studies: 1. Geometry as a language‑game: we reconstruct Hilbert’s axiomatic method as a paradigmatic example. Hilbert’s primitive terms (point, line, plane) receive their meaning solely through the axioms, which function as rules for manipulating symbols. By changing a single axiom (the parallel postulate), we obtain new, consistent language‑games (Euclidean vs. hyperbolic geometry). This shows that geometry is not about a pre‑existing spatial reality but about a formal system whose “truth” is replaced by consistency and usability. 2. Logic as a language‑game: we analyse propositional logic, with its vocabulary (sentence letters, connectives) and rules (modus ponens, double negation, non‑contradiction). We argue that logical rules are not discovered a priori but are constitutive of what we call “reasoning”. They are part of the normative framework of our inferential practices. Additionally, we employ comparative anthropological data (Lévy‑Bruhl on the Ipon tribe; counting practices in the Torres Strait) to demonstrate that alternative inferential and computational practices exist, which suggests that our logical and mathematical rules are contingent upon our social forms of life rather than being universally necessary. 3. Discussion and Results Our analysis reveals that foundationalism fails because it mistakes the grammatical status of rules for the propositional status of factual claims. When we ask for the justification of modus ponens or of the principle of non‑contradiction, we are trying to measure our measuring rod. The certainty of these rules is not a property of their correspondence with reality; it is a reflection of their role as standards of correctness within the practice of inference. Wittgenstein explicitly states: “Inference is part of a language‑game. And the person who makes logical inferences follows certain instructions that have been given to him in learning the language‑game” (RFM, p. 378). Thus, the “hardness” of logic is not a metaphysical necessity but a pragmatic one: we call something “valid inference” only if it conforms to these rules. This is analogous to using a metre stick: we cannot question the correctness of the metre stick itself in the same way we question the length of a table, because the metre stick is the standard by which correctness is determined. The two case studies support this conclusion. In geometry, the shift from Euclidean to non‑Euclidean systems shows that no axiom is intrinsically certain; its role is determined by the game we choose to play. The consistency of the system is all that matters for internal validity. In logic, the law of non‑contradiction is not a high‑level empirical generalisation; it is a rule that tells us when to stop playing—it signals that a contradiction has arisen and we cannot continue with the same moves. As Wittgenstein notes, “Contradiction can only occur among the rules of a game” (Notebooks, p. 321). Its force is not ontological but procedural. Our anthropological examples further illustrate that alternative practices are entirely coherent within their own contexts. The Ipon tribe do not infer death from a wound in the way we do; they invoke sorcery. This does not mean they are irrational; they are following a different set of rules for explanation. The Torres Strait counting method is not an inferior version of our arithmetic; it is a different practical technique for enumeration. These examples underscore that what we call “necessary” is only necessary relative to the practices we have adopted. There is no trans‑cultural, trans‑historical foundation for arithmetic or logic; there is only the practical skill and shared training that enable us to count and infer in the ways we do. Consequently, the certainty of a valid inference or a correct calculation derives from our trust in the practice—our confidence, built through repeated successful applications, that following the rules will lead to a determinate outcome. This is not a blind faith but a trained ability. As Wittgenstein puts it: “I examine the proof and then accept its result. That is simply what we do. This is a custom and a practice among us, or a fact of our natural history” (RFM, p. 61). The “inexorability” of mathematics is therefore not a property of the propositions themselves but of our commitment to the practice. 4. Conclusion We conclude that the traditional foundationalist project for mathematics is misconceived. The later Wittgenstein offers a viable alternative: mathematics is a language‑game, and its rules are not in need of external justification because they are constitutive of the activity of reasoning and calculating. The certainty and inexorability that we attribute to mathematical and logical propositions arise from the grammatical role these rules play within the practical procedure (practice) of inference and computation. This certainty is a form of practical trust and skill, not a reflection of metaphysical necessity. Our analysis shows: 1. The demand for a foundation stems from a grammatical error: confusing a rule with a proposition that can be true or false. 2. Hilbert’s axiomatic geometry and classical logic are best understood as language‑games with their own internal standards of correctness; these standards are arbitrary in the sense that they could be different, but they are not arbitrary in the sense that they are freely chosen by individuals—they are embedded in our shared forms of life. 3. The “hardness” of logic and mathematics is the hardness of the practice itself; it is the result of our training and the social consensus that sustains the practice. 4. We do not need a foundation to justify mathematics; we need a clarification of its grammar. The task of philosophy is not to reform or justify mathematics but to describe what mathematicians actually do and how their practices hang together. In sum, the paper provides a robust Wittgensteinian response to the problem of mathematical certainty, showing that the practice‑based approach dissolves the classical foundationalist anxieties without reducing mathematics to mere convention. It invites philosophers and mathematicians to abandon the search for an indubitable ground and instead to appreciate the rich, dynamic, and socially embedded character of mathematical activity.

Abstract The central claim of this article is that the philosophy of medicine emerged through a critical confrontation with classical philosophy of science, a confrontation that coincided with the very possibility of articulating the contemporary medical crisis. This simultaneity is not accidental; rather, it discloses the inability of classical philosophy of science to grasp the practical, clinical, and social character of medicine. The rise of the philosophy of medicine is thus presented as internally connected both to the limits of classical philosophy of science and to the formulation of the modern medical crisis. The paper first reconstructs the conceptual framework of classical philosophy of science and identifies its shortcomings in accounting for the nature of medicine. It then examines the idea of medical crisis, arguing that excessive scientification and technologization have dehumanized the clinical encounter and prompted critical reflection. The Kaplan–Pellegrino debate is analyzed as a key historical moment. Drawing on Wieland, Fleck, and Sadeghzadeh, the article develops a positive account of medicine as a distinct kind of knowledge and considers its implications. The implications of this shift include a critique of contemporary medicine and a rethinking of the relationship between science, practice, and the modern human sciences. Keywords: classical philosophy of science; philosophy of medicine; medical crisis; classification of the sciences; practice. Introduction Medicine has long occupied a problematic epistemic position within the modern classification of the sciences. Unlike the natural sciences, whose theoretical foundations appear comparatively stable, medicine has persistently stood at the intersection of scientific knowledge, practical intervention, ethical judgment, and social institution. While it relies heavily on biomedical research and empirical methodologies, its core activity—clinical practice—unfolds within the physician–patient relationship and involves value judgments, uncertainty, and responsibility. This dual character has made medicine difficult to situate within the traditional tripartite division of the sciences into natural, human, and social domains. The central claim of this article is that the philosophy of medicine emerged through a critical confrontation with classical philosophy of science, and that this confrontation coincided with the very possibility of articulating what has come to be described as the modern medical crisis. This simultaneity is not accidental. Rather, it reveals the conceptual inadequacy of classical philosophy of science in grasping the practical, clinical, and social character of medicine. The rise of the philosophy of medicine must therefore be understood as internally connected both to the limits of classical philosophy of science and to the formulation of the contemporary crisis in medicine. Materials and Methods This study adopts a conceptual–historical and analytical methodology. It reconstructs the conceptual framework of classical philosophy of science as it developed in logical positivism, critical rationalism, and law-centered models of scientific explanation. These traditions, despite internal differences, share a commitment to understanding science primarily as theoretical, proposition-based, and truth-oriented knowledge. The analysis then examines how medicine was interpreted within this framework, either as a branch of natural science reducible to biology and ultimately physics–chemistry, or as an applied science whose philosophical problems could be resolved within the general philosophy of science. To evaluate these assumptions, the article engages with major figures in twentieth-century philosophy of medicine and science, including Wieland, Fleck, Pellegrino, Caplan, and Sadeghzadeh. Wieland’s distinction between theoretical and practical sciences provides a systematic critique of the reduction of practical domains to theoretical models. Fleck’s notion of thought style and the rejection of the “Euclidean ideal” illuminates the historically situated and practice-embedded character of medical knowledge. Pellegrino’s emphasis on phronesis and the telos of healing clarifies the normative and relational dimensions of clinical medicine. Sadeghzadeh’s analytic distinction between biomedical science and clinical medicine sharpens the conceptual differentiation between theoretical research and practical judgment. The study also incorporates an analysis of the 1970s Kaplan–Pellegrino controversy as a historical moment in which the autonomy of philosophy of medicine was explicitly debated. Discussion and Results The analysis demonstrates that classical philosophy of science lacks the conceptual tools necessary to account for the distinctive rationality of medicine. Its focus on truth, explanation, and theoretical structure marginalizes domains whose primary orientation is toward action, decision, and responsibility. The medical crisis of the late twentieth century—often described in terms of declining quality of care, dehumanization, and excessive technologization—exposed the limits of an exclusively scientific model of medicine. Excessive scientification and technological mediation contributed to the objectification of the patient and the reduction of illness to measurable pathology. Yet the crisis did not represent a failure of science as such. Rather, it revealed the insufficiency of a framework that treated theoretical science as the exclusive model of rationality. The Kaplan–Pellegrino debate crystallized this issue. Caplan defended the view that philosophy of medicine lacked independent foundations and should remain subordinate to philosophy of science and bioethics. Pellegrino countered that medicine is fundamentally a moral and practical enterprise centered on the physician–patient encounter. This disagreement reflected two divergent conceptions of medicine: one as applied science, the other as a practice structured by its telos—healing—and guided by practical wisdom (phronesis). Drawing on Wieland, the article argues that medicine belongs to the domain of practical sciences. Theoretical sciences aim at describing and explaining what is; practical sciences guide action within concrete and uncertain situations. Clinical medicine is paradigmatic in this regard: it integrates scientific knowledge, contextual judgment, and normative evaluation in order to reach decisions concerning a particular patient. Fleck’s critique of the “Euclidean ideal” further undermines the expectation that medicine should conform to a deductively structured, context-independent theoretical model. Medical knowledge develops within historically situated thought styles and institutional practices. Its variability and context-dependence are structural features rather than epistemic defects. Sadeghzadeh’s distinction between biomedical research and clinical medicine reinforces this conclusion. While biomedical sciences generate theoretical knowledge, clinical medicine organizes conditional rules of action oriented toward therapeutic goals. The criterion of validity shifts from propositional truth alone to the responsible guidance of action in singular situations. The result of these analyses is a positive reconfiguration of medicine as a distinct kind of knowledge—practical, normative, institutional, and relational. This reconfiguration opens broader implications beyond medicine itself. It challenges the monopoly of theoretical science as the universal model of rationality and invites reconsideration of the relationship between science, practice, and the modern human sciences. Conclusion The emergence of the philosophy of medicine cannot be understood as a mere specialization within philosophy of science. It arose from a critical recognition that the dominant theoretical model of science was incapable of adequately accounting for the nature of medicine. This recognition coincided with the articulation of the medical crisis and enabled its philosophical formulation. By relocating the center of analysis from abstract scientific knowledge to the clinical encounter, philosophy of medicine has made possible an immanent critique of contemporary medicine—one that does not reject science or technology, but resists their unqualified dominance. It restores attention to practical judgment, normative responsibility, and the physician–patient relationship. More broadly, the distinction between theoretical and practical sciences, clarified through the case of medicine, invites a reconsideration of modern rationality itself. Medicine becomes a field in which knowledge and action, science and institution, and fact and value are inseparably intertwined. In this sense, philosophy of medicine serves not only as a response to the internal tensions of modern medicine, but also as a critical site for rethinking the relationship between science, practice, and the human sciences in the modern world.