پارادوکس مور و آگاهی

نوع مقاله: علمی-پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه اصفهان

2 گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان

چکیده

جملات موری جملاتی مانند "P اما من باور ندارم که P" و "P اما من باور دارم که ~P" هستند که علی‌رغم ممکن الصدق بودن محتوای آنها اظهار یا باور به آنها با نوعی پوچی (absurdity) همراه است. بر اساس برخی از خوانش‌های نظریه‌های مرتبه بالاتر آگاهی مانند نظریه‌های فکر مرتبه بالاتر (HOT)، ادعا می‌شود باورآگاهانه نسبت به جملات موری ممکن نیست به این معنا که شخص با باورِ آگاهانه آن‌ها در مجموعه باورهای خود دچار عدم عقلانیت خواهد شد. در این مقاله ابتدا به معرفی نظریه‌های مرتبه بالاتر آگاهی و نحوه کاربست آن‌ها در تبیین پوچی اظهار و باور جملات موری پرداخته و سپس استدلال می‌کنیم که رویکردهای مبتنی بر نظریه‌های مرتبه بالاتر آگاهی در مورد پارادوکس مور بر مبنای چهار نقد قادر به ارائه تبیین قابل قبولی برای پوچی جملات موری نیستند.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

Moore's Paradox and Consciousness

نویسندگان [English]

  • seyed ali kalantari 1
  • Ruhollah Ebrahimpour Esfahani 2
1 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Isfahan
2 philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Human Science, university of Isfahan, Isfahan
چکیده [English]

Moore’s sentences are sentences of the form “p but I don't believe that p” or “p but I believe that not-p”. These sentences might be true, yet they are ‘absurd’ to believe or assert. According to some version of Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness such as Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOT), it is claimed that conscious beliefs in Moorean sentences is not possible. Namely, one will become irrational with their conscious beliefs in their set of beliefs. In this paper we will first introduce Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and will show that How they work. we will then argue that there are at least four criticisms against approaches based on Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness in relation of Moore's Paradox and thus are not tenable.
Key words: Moore's paradox, epistemic paradox, rationality, Consciousness, Higher-Order Thought Theory

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Moore's paradox
  • epistemic paradox
  • rationality
  • Consciousness
  • Higher-Order Thought Theory
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