عنوان مقاله [English]
As moral principles constrain our actions normatively, distinguish them into correct and incorrect categories; according to normativity of logic thesis, logical principles constrain normatively our thinking and reasoning (e.g. see MacFarlane 2004; Steinberger 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). There are various formulations for the normativity in the literature which have been subject to sever debates in the last decades. In this paper I will consider such formulations on the basis of Harman's (1984, 1986) famous objections. Harman's strategy to criticize the normativity is try to justify the claim that there is no rational way to formulate the thesis. I will argue, however, that there is a plausible formulation for the normativity of logic thesis such that survives Harman's attacks. In the last step, I will explain the normativity of logic thesis, on the basis of the concept of belief. In order to do so, I will elucidate the normativity of belief thesis, and then argue that the thesis entails the normativity of logic thesis.