ثابت‌های بنیادی در مدل‌های استاندارد فیزیک ذرات و کیهان‌شناسی حیات در جهان ما را توضیح می‌دهند. هر گونه تغییری در این ثابت‌ها حیات را غیرممکن میکند. یکی از راههای توجیه این شرایط ایدة جهان‌های متعددی است که قوانین فیزیکی در هر یک از آن‌ها مستقلاً ساختاربندی شده است و ما در یکی از آن‌ها، که با پیچیدگی سازگار است، قرار گرفته‌ایم. از سوی دیگر ایدة چندجهانی، به طور طبیعی از بسیاری مدل‌های فیزیکی، اعم از این‌که مورد پذیرش قطعی قرار گرفته باشند (مثل نظریة نسبیت عام) یا در مقام نظر باشند (مثل نظریة ریسمان) نیز نتیجه می‌شود. با توجه به مشاهده‌ناپذیری و آزمون‌ناپذیری جهان‌های متعدد موجود در این نظریه‌ها، پرسش اصلی آن است که آیا چندجهانی معیار رایج علم را ارضا میکند؟ در این مقاله ضمن بحث در این باره، راههای متفاوتی را که منجر به علمی قلمداد کردن این ایده می‌شود، بررسی می‌کنیم.
1PHD in philosophy of Science and Technology from Sharif University of Technology, Assistant Professor of Physics Department at Sistan and Baluchestan University, Iran,
2PhD of Physics, Chairman of the Philosophy of Science Department, Sharif
چکیده [English]
In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable adherents and mainly logical positivist philosophers were its defenders. The received view has two important problems: 1- it is highly impractical that we want to formalize the scientific theories in the first order logic language and 2- its characterization of role and status of models in the scientific theories is inappropriate. We will notice that the semantic view, in particular the version that da Costa and French introduced, by its use of structure, can dissolve these problems and many problems that this view is involved with and this approach is in agreement with what scientists do in reality, in particular physicists try to model natural phenomena.
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