IHCS Philosophy of Science 2383-0722 5 10 2016 02 20 Stephens’ Model inability to Limiting ‘Better Safe than Sorry’ Argument Stephens’ Model inability to Limiting ‘Better Safe than Sorry’ Argument 1 20 1979 FA Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Eatemad Al-Eslami Bakhtiari PhD student in Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology Mirsaeid Mousavi Karimi Associated Professor of Mofid University, Philosophy Department, mmkarimi@sharif.edu Journal Article 2015 04 07 Some philosophers believe that natural selection guarantees the reliability of belief formation processes. From their point of view, belief formation processes that lead to true beliefs more than false ones are useful for organism reproduction and survival, and so are saved by natural selection. However, Stephen Stich’s argument, called “better safe than sorry”, shows that natural selection is not sufficient for the reliability of belief formation processes. Criticizing this argument, Cristopher L. Stephen has proposed a model that identifies situations in which natural selection supports true beliefs. He claims that the model limits Stich’s argument scope. In this article we argue that Stephens’ model is unable to limit Stich’s argument scope and has no essential determining role in the challenge of evolutionary based explanation between opponents and proponents for the reliability of belief formation processes. Some philosophers believe that natural selection guarantees the reliability of belief formation processes. From their point of view, belief formation processes that lead to true beliefs more than false ones are useful for organism reproduction and survival, and so are saved by natural selection. However, Stephen Stich’s argument, called “better safe than sorry”, shows that natural selection is not sufficient for the reliability of belief formation processes. Criticizing this argument, Cristopher L. Stephen has proposed a model that identifies situations in which natural selection supports true beliefs. He claims that the model limits Stich’s argument scope. In this article we argue that Stephens’ model is unable to limit Stich’s argument scope and has no essential determining role in the challenge of evolutionary based explanation between opponents and proponents for the reliability of belief formation processes.

IHCS Philosophy of Science 2383-0722 5 10 2016 02 20 Means-Ends Rationality, a Framework for Rationality of Science; a Review of Laudan's Theories of Scientific Rationality Means-Ends Rationality, a Framework for Rationality of Science; a Review of Laudan's Theories of Scientific Rationality 21 37 1981 FA Amin Rabinia M.A in philosophy of science, Amir Kabir University, Amin Journal Article 2015 06 13 The problem of the rationality of science needs a framework to outline what rationality is and how it can be placed in scientific adventure. In this paper, I will try to show how we can provide such a (meta-level) framework using the notion of means-ends rationality. For doing so, we have to see science as a process in which there are given aims, and the rationality of achieving such aims could be justified in the light of the notion of means-ends rationality. This notion also is divided into two forms: instrumental rationality and holistic rationality. Here it will become clear that choosing a holistic notion of rationality is essential for having a sustainable account of scientific rationality.  In the meantime, to propose a concrete example of the implementation of this framework, I do reconstruct Laudan’s models of scientific rationality using the conceptual frameworks of instrumental and holistic rationality. This will illustrate how his models grow through these two notions of rationality, and also how much the conceptual framework of means-ends rationality is capable to explain it. The problem of the rationality of science needs a framework to outline what rationality is and how it can be placed in scientific adventure. In this paper, I will try to show how we can provide such a (meta-level) framework using the notion of means-ends rationality. For doing so, we have to see science as a process in which there are given aims, and the rationality of achieving such aims could be justified in the light of the notion of means-ends rationality. This notion also is divided into two forms: instrumental rationality and holistic rationality. Here it will become clear that choosing a holistic notion of rationality is essential for having a sustainable account of scientific rationality.  In the meantime, to propose a concrete example of the implementation of this framework, I do reconstruct Laudan’s models of scientific rationality using the conceptual frameworks of instrumental and holistic rationality. This will illustrate how his models grow through these two notions of rationality, and also how much the conceptual framework of means-ends rationality is capable to explain it.

IHCS Philosophy of Science 2383-0722 5 10 2016 02 20 Evolutionary Game Theory and Re-examination of the Idea of ‘Progress in Game Theory’; From the Methodology of Economics perspective Evolutionary Game Theory and Re-examination of the Idea of ‘Progress in Game Theory’; From the Methodology of Economics perspective 39 63 1982 FA Journal Article 2015 08 06   <br />It seems that emergence of evolutionary game theory and the spread of its popularity and utilization, indicates a change in tools of game theory which used by game theorists and economists; insomuch as some considers this theory as a progress in the classical game theory. This article, first, seeks to outline the essential differences between classical game theory and evolutionary game theory. Secondly, we raise the question that ‘whether the evolutionary game theory can be seen as a kind of progress on the classical game theory?’ This inquiry is based on a theoretical approach and focuses on some studies in the philosophy of economics, methodology of economics, history of game theory and philosophy of science. The conclusion of this paper can be elaborated in two related ideas. First, the emergence of evolutionary game theory and its continued use in economics cannot be analyzed in the framework of well-ordered approaches in the philosophy of science. Second, it seems that Feyerabend and McCloskey’s explanations on this subject gain better ‘validity’. <br />    <br />It seems that emergence of evolutionary game theory and the spread of its popularity and utilization, indicates a change in tools of game theory which used by game theorists and economists; insomuch as some considers this theory as a progress in the classical game theory. This article, first, seeks to outline the essential differences between classical game theory and evolutionary game theory. Secondly, we raise the question that ‘whether the evolutionary game theory can be seen as a kind of progress on the classical game theory?’ This inquiry is based on a theoretical approach and focuses on some studies in the philosophy of economics, methodology of economics, history of game theory and philosophy of science. The conclusion of this paper can be elaborated in two related ideas. First, the emergence of evolutionary game theory and its continued use in economics cannot be analyzed in the framework of well-ordered approaches in the philosophy of science. Second, it seems that Feyerabend and McCloskey’s explanations on this subject gain better ‘validity’. <br /> 

IHCS Philosophy of Science 2383-0722 5 10 2016 02 20 From Scientific Realism of Latour to Bhaskar’s Critical Realism From Scientific Realism of Latour to Bhaskar’s Critical Realism 65 80 1983 FA Mahnaz Farahmand Assistant Professor of Sociology, Yazd University, Journal Article 2015 05 08 As a controversial notion, realism has always been a major concern of philosophers of science and experts in the field of sociology of scientific knowledge. The main aim of this article is to review and study the two different approaches of Bhaskar’s concept of critical realism and Latour's realism. <br />Bhaskar argues that there is more ‘what is there’ than ’what is known’; there is more power to the use than application of power. Appealing Constructivism, Latour, in the opposite side, emphasizes making scientific facts thorough the process of scientific activity. In this paper, Latour and Bhaskar's main claims are illustrated in details, and also through a comparative study of their ideas, congruent and different aspects of their thoughts will be described.  As a controversial notion, realism has always been a major concern of philosophers of science and experts in the field of sociology of scientific knowledge. The main aim of this article is to review and study the two different approaches of Bhaskar’s concept of critical realism and Latour's realism. <br />Bhaskar argues that there is more ‘what is there’ than ’what is known’; there is more power to the use than application of power. Appealing Constructivism, Latour, in the opposite side, emphasizes making scientific facts thorough the process of scientific activity. In this paper, Latour and Bhaskar's main claims are illustrated in details, and also through a comparative study of their ideas, congruent and different aspects of their thoughts will be described. 

IHCS Philosophy of Science 2383-0722 5 10 2016 02 20 Explanation as Unification Explanation as Unification 81 96 1984 FA Maryam Ghasemi Naraghi PhD student in philosophy of science, Islamic Azad University, Tehran Journal Article 2015 07 07 رایج‏ترین نظریه‏ای که آغازگر بحث تبیین در قرن بیستم است، نظریه‏ی قانون فراگیر تبیین، شامل دو الگوی قیاسی- قانونی و استقرایی- آماری است. کارل همپل بیان دقیقی از ایده‏ی تبیین علمی را که توسط هیوم و میل صورتبندی مبهمی داشت، به تصویر می‏کشد. نقدهای جدی که در نیمه‏ی دوم قرن بیستم درخصوص این نظریه مطرح شد، راه را برای نظریه‏های دیگر گشود. الگوی وحدت‏بخشی تبیین که طرح اولیه‏ی آن توسط مایکل فریدمن مطرح و توسط فیلیپ کیچر توسعه یافت، از مهم‏ترین این الگوهاست. بنابر رویکرد کیچر علم، فهم ما نسبت به جهان را به کمک وحدت‏ بخشیدن پدیده‏های مختلف افزایش می‏دهد. وحدت‏بخشی در چارچوب معرفت علمی، با به حداقل رساندن شمار الگوهای استنتاج و به حداکثر ارتقا دادن شمار نتایج تولید شده، به‏دست می‏آید. در این جستار با شرح و بازسازی الگوی وحدت‏بخشی تبیین، نشان خواهیم داد این الگو برخی از مشکلات سنتی مدل قانون فراگیر را حل می‏کند. <br />کلید واژه‏ها : تبیین علمی، مدل قانون فراگیر، الگوهای استدلال، وحدت‏بخشی، قدرت تبیینی <br />  رایج‏ترین نظریه‏ای که آغازگر بحث تبیین در قرن بیستم است، نظریه‏ی قانون فراگیر تبیین، شامل دو الگوی قیاسی- قانونی و استقرایی- آماری است. کارل همپل بیان دقیقی از ایده‏ی تبیین علمی را که توسط هیوم و میل صورتبندی مبهمی داشت، به تصویر می‏کشد. نقدهای جدی که در نیمه‏ی دوم قرن بیستم درخصوص این نظریه مطرح شد، راه را برای نظریه‏های دیگر گشود. الگوی وحدت‏بخشی تبیین که طرح اولیه‏ی آن توسط مایکل فریدمن مطرح و توسط فیلیپ کیچر توسعه یافت، از مهم‏ترین این الگوهاست. بنابر رویکرد کیچر علم، فهم ما نسبت به جهان را به کمک وحدت‏ بخشیدن پدیده‏های مختلف افزایش می‏دهد. وحدت‏بخشی در چارچوب معرفت علمی، با به حداقل رساندن شمار الگوهای استنتاج و به حداکثر ارتقا دادن شمار نتایج تولید شده، به‏دست می‏آید. در این جستار با شرح و بازسازی الگوی وحدت‏بخشی تبیین، نشان خواهیم داد این الگو برخی از مشکلات سنتی مدل قانون فراگیر را حل می‏کند. <br />کلید واژه‏ها : تبیین علمی، مدل قانون فراگیر، الگوهای استدلال، وحدت‏بخشی، قدرت تبیینی <br /> 

IHCS Philosophy of Science 2383-0722 5 10 2016 02 20 A study on the possibility of inertia in Aristotelian physics A study on the possibility of inertia in Aristotelian physics 97 111 1985 FA Farzane Ghadamyari M.A in Philosophy, Allame Tabataba’i University, Literature & Foreign languages Faculty Hossein Kalbasi Ashtari Professor of Philosophy, Allame Tabataba’i University, Literature & Foreign languages Faculty Journal Article 2015 07 08 Analysis of the concept of inertia as the first law of motion in classical physics, on which the explanation of movement is based, and Aristotelian and classical physics as two intellectual mainstreams, which have been dominant for hundreds of years, is the main concern of this article. In this paper possibility of the concept of inertia in Aristotelian physics will be questioned and analyzed. It should be noted that the possibility of assigning the components of the two physics to each other or matching them has always been the concern of scholars. The findings of this paper indicate that Aristotle through discussing concepts of natural motion and forced motion implicitly mentioned the concept of inertia. Analysis of the concept of inertia as the first law of motion in classical physics, on which the explanation of movement is based, and Aristotelian and classical physics as two intellectual mainstreams, which have been dominant for hundreds of years, is the main concern of this article. In this paper possibility of the concept of inertia in Aristotelian physics will be questioned and analyzed. It should be noted that the possibility of assigning the components of the two physics to each other or matching them has always been the concern of scholars. The findings of this paper indicate that Aristotle through discussing concepts of natural motion and forced motion implicitly mentioned the concept of inertia.