IHCSPhilosophy of Science2383-07225920150823Multiverse, Scientific or Philosophic?Multiverse, Scientific or Philosophic?1281726FAAlirezaSobhaniPHD in philosophy of Science and Technology from Sharif University of Technology, Assistant Professor of Physics Department at Sistan and Baluchestan University, Iran,MehdiGolshaniPhD of Physics, Chairman of the Philosophy of Science Department, SharifJournal Article20140916<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;">In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable adherents and mainly logical positivist philosophers were its defenders. The received view has two important problems: 1- it is highly impractical that we want to formalize the scientific theories in the first order logic language and 2- its characterization of role and status of models in the scientific theories is inappropriate. We will notice that the semantic view, in particular the version that da Costa and French introduced, by its use of structure, can dissolve these problems and many problems that this view is involved with and this approach is in agreement with what scientists do in reality, in particular physicists try to model natural phenomena.</span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;">In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable adherents and mainly logical positivist philosophers were its defenders. The received view has two important problems: 1- it is highly impractical that we want to formalize the scientific theories in the first order logic language and 2- its characterization of role and status of models in the scientific theories is inappropriate. We will notice that the semantic view, in particular the version that da Costa and French introduced, by its use of structure, can dissolve these problems and many problems that this view is involved with and this approach is in agreement with what scientists do in reality, in particular physicists try to model natural phenomena.</span>IHCSPhilosophy of Science2383-07225920150823Leaving the Dichotomy of Autonomous Technology and Technology as an Intermediary
Based on Latour’s Point of ViewLeaving the Dichotomy of Autonomous Technology and Technology as an Intermediary
Based on Latour’s Point of View29511727FARahmanSharifzadeh; PhD student in philosophy of science and technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural StudiesGolamhosseinMoghadamHeidariassistant professor of philosophy of science department, Institute for Humanities and Cultural StudiesJournal Article20140615
Bruno Latour, redefining human and their artifacts and defending their multi-threaded nature, considering their intermediaries (not only as devices), defends their status as citizens. Doing this he frees us from the duality of the autonomous technology and therefore from the domination atmosphere (domination of human over non-human and domination of non-human over man).
Bruno Latour, redefining human and their artifacts and defending their multi-threaded nature, considering their intermediaries (not only as devices), defends their status as citizens. Doing this he frees us from the duality of the autonomous technology and therefore from the domination atmosphere (domination of human over non-human and domination of non-human over man).IHCSPhilosophy of Science2383-07225920150823Kuhn’s Criticism of EmpiricismKuhn’s Criticism of Empiricism53771728FARezaSadeqiassistant professor and chairman of Philosophy Group, Isfahan UniversityJournal Article20140720Kuhn’s philosophy is known as the beginning of thpost-positivistic period. In this essay by reviewing Kuhn's critiques on empiricism we'll see that by weakening and justifying the epistemic roles of experience he tries to support and expand the relativism to the realm of natural sciences. Although Kuhn seriously criticizes the Vienna Circle, he at the same time maintains some of positivist principles. Thus, according to some interpretations Kuhn’s relativism is the logical consequence of some positivistic foundations and therefore his view is the continuation of positivism. Evaluation evidences of this claim would be the end of this essay.Kuhn’s philosophy is known as the beginning of thpost-positivistic period. In this essay by reviewing Kuhn's critiques on empiricism we'll see that by weakening and justifying the epistemic roles of experience he tries to support and expand the relativism to the realm of natural sciences. Although Kuhn seriously criticizes the Vienna Circle, he at the same time maintains some of positivist principles. Thus, according to some interpretations Kuhn’s relativism is the logical consequence of some positivistic foundations and therefore his view is the continuation of positivism. Evaluation evidences of this claim would be the end of this essay.IHCSPhilosophy of Science2383-07225920150823A Critical Analysis of Epistemic Realism from the Viewpoint of Larry Laudan:
Does the Epistemic Realism Proposes a Truthful Explanation of the Scientific Progress?A Critical Analysis of Epistemic Realism from the Viewpoint of Larry Laudan:
Does the Epistemic Realism Proposes a Truthful Explanation of the Scientific Progress?791001729FAZohrehAbdekhodaiePhD Student of Comparative Philosophy, AllamehTabatabaee University, (corresponding author)GhasemPurhasanAssociate Professor of Philosophy, AllamehTabataba’ee UniversityAli AkbarAhmadi AfarmajaniAssistant Professor of philosophy,AllamehTabataba'ee UniversityHosseinKalbasiAshtariProfessor of Philosophy AllamehTabataba’ee University.Journal Article20140412IHCSPhilosophy of Science2383-07225920150823Challenges of Modern Science From the Perspective of Dr. NasrChallenges of Modern Science From the Perspective of Dr. Nasr1011121730FARashidGhaneiMA in philosophy at Sharif University, a PhD student in public policy at TarbiatModarres UniversitySeyed HassanHosseiniProfessor of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of TechnologyJournal Article20140608Modern science, soul faculties, traditional knowledge, Islamic world, science, the power of imagination, the power of reason
Modern science, soul faculties, traditional knowledge, Islamic world, science, the power of imagination, the power of reason
IHCSPhilosophy of Science2383-07225920150823Quiddity of the Scientific Theories?Quiddity of the Scientific Theories?1131431731FASaeedMasoumiAssistant Professor at The Institute for Research in Science and Technology Studies, ShahidBeheshti UniversityJournal Article20140510In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable adherents and mainly logical positivist philosophers were its defenders. The received view has two important problems: 1- it is highly impractical that we want to formalize the scientific theories in the first order logic language and 2- its characterization of role and status of models in the scientific theories is inappropriate. We will notice that the semantic view, in particular the version that da Costa and French introduced, by its use of structure, can dissolve these problems and many problems that this view is involved with and this approach is in agreement with what scientists do in reality, in particular physicists try to model natural phenomena.In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable adherents and mainly logical positivist philosophers were its defenders. The received view has two important problems: 1- it is highly impractical that we want to formalize the scientific theories in the first order logic language and 2- its characterization of role and status of models in the scientific theories is inappropriate. We will notice that the semantic view, in particular the version that da Costa and French introduced, by its use of structure, can dissolve these problems and many problems that this view is involved with and this approach is in agreement with what scientists do in reality, in particular physicists try to model natural phenomena.IHCSPhilosophy of Science2383-07225920150823Formalizing Lagrangian Mechanics and the Invariance of Lagrange EquationsFormalizing Lagrangian Mechanics and the Invariance of Lagrange Equations1431611732FARezaSadeqiassistant professor and chairman of Philosophy Group, Isfahan University,Journal Article20140711
According to the logical empiricists, the received view, a scientific theory is a set of propositions formalized in first-order logic. According to the rival view, semantic or non-propositional view, it is a set of models. In this article, I will argue that the received view cannot suggest an acceptable model for identifying the generalized forces in classical mechanics. In the second section, the invariance of Lagrange equations and its consequences are discussed. Besides, I show that the invariance implies that alike physical magnitudes will be different dimensionally. The third section firstly introduces the last version of the received view. After that, it is argued that Lagrangian mechanics formalized in this view cannot identify alike physical magnitudes similarly. In the last section, the semantic view of Suppes-Sneed and Lagrangian mechanics in this view are introduced. Finally, I show that this view can identify alike physical magnitudes similarly.
According to the logical empiricists, the received view, a scientific theory is a set of propositions formalized in first-order logic. According to the rival view, semantic or non-propositional view, it is a set of models. In this article, I will argue that the received view cannot suggest an acceptable model for identifying the generalized forces in classical mechanics. In the second section, the invariance of Lagrange equations and its consequences are discussed. Besides, I show that the invariance implies that alike physical magnitudes will be different dimensionally. The third section firstly introduces the last version of the received view. After that, it is argued that Lagrangian mechanics formalized in this view cannot identify alike physical magnitudes similarly. In the last section, the semantic view of Suppes-Sneed and Lagrangian mechanics in this view are introduced. Finally, I show that this view can identify alike physical magnitudes similarly.