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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Carnap and Quine, Confrontation in Metaontology</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Carnap and Quine, Confrontation in Metaontology</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>27</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5251</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5251</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mohammad Hosein</FirstName>
					<LastName>Esfandiari</LastName>
<Affiliation>Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-8772-2887</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>12</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Carnap’s view on ontology had not yet rallied that Quine attacked it; and this has caused a dispute between two philosophers for more than half a century. The question remains: which one was/is right? In this article after reviewing Carnap’s view, I have recounted Quine’s critiques, here and there, to his stands under three titles. It is shown how Carnap’s view can be justified from these three critiques. Then, after considering that Quine has identified the position of the difference incorrectly, but not the different position, I have explained, In the midst of arbitration between two philosophers, although Carnap and Quine, both, do maintain ontological relativity, the former believes in ‘general relativity’, and the latter in ‘special relativity’. From another point of view, although two philosopher do maintain ontological skepticism, the former is ‘second level skeptic’, and the latter is ‘first level skeptic’. In the other words. I have shown how in ontological approach of two philosophers “the reason for the agreement is the same for disagreement”. Among these complexities the conclusion is taken that any unilateral arbitration, on strict agreement or disagreement, will be wrong.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Carnap’s view on ontology had not yet rallied that Quine attacked it; and this has caused a dispute between two philosophers for more than half a century. The question remains: which one was/is right? In this article after reviewing Carnap’s view, I have recounted Quine’s critiques, here and there, to his stands under three titles. It is shown how Carnap’s view can be justified from these three critiques. Then, after considering that Quine has identified the position of the difference incorrectly, but not the different position, I have explained, In the midst of arbitration between two philosophers, although Carnap and Quine, both, do maintain ontological relativity, the former believes in ‘general relativity’, and the latter in ‘special relativity’. From another point of view, although two philosopher do maintain ontological skepticism, the former is ‘second level skeptic’, and the latter is ‘first level skeptic’. In the other words. I have shown how in ontological approach of two philosophers “the reason for the agreement is the same for disagreement”. Among these complexities the conclusion is taken that any unilateral arbitration, on strict agreement or disagreement, will be wrong.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Carnap</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Quine</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">metaontology</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">ontological skepticism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">ontological relativity</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5251_d778aeecfdbe4ca4b47466e00990df5c.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>An Analysis of Friedman&#039;s methodological specifications</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>An Analysis of Friedman&#039;s methodological specifications</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>29</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>53</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5234</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5234</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Seyed Mohammad Reza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Amiri Tehrani</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Mahdian</LastName>
<Affiliation>Expert in Charge of the Derivatives Settlement Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Abstract&lt;br /&gt; This article is about Milton Friedman&#039;s methodology in Economics. Friedman&#039;s main article &quot;The ‎Methodology of Positive Economics&quot; published in ‎‏1953‏‎ is a mixture of philosophical ideas. By ‎analyzing this article and critics of his methodology among economics philosophers as well, we ‎recognize six specification for his methodology. The first is Friedman&#039; theory which is a complex ‎intermixture of two elements; language and substantive hypothesis. The second is Friedman&#039; ‎experiment, which is in fact an indirect testing of a theoretical prediction by experimental ‎evidences. So the validity of a theory depends on its power or prediction, not the truth of its ‎assumptions. The third is Friedman&#039;s unrealisticness that allows substantial hypotheses to capture ‎useful aspects of reality not the whole. The forth is the Marshallian approach of Friedman in ‎Economics versus the Walrasian, which lets him to build the economic model problem specific. The ‎fifth is Friedman&#039;s statistical approach. He believes that the only way that economists can come up ‎with a consensus is to use statistics and probabilities. The sixth is Friedman&#039;s causality. He believes ‎that the concepts of cause and effect are ambiguous, instead, we should use endogenous and ‎exogenous concepts in economic models. ‎</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Abstract&lt;br /&gt; This article is about Milton Friedman&#039;s methodology in Economics. Friedman&#039;s main article &quot;The ‎Methodology of Positive Economics&quot; published in ‎‏1953‏‎ is a mixture of philosophical ideas. By ‎analyzing this article and critics of his methodology among economics philosophers as well, we ‎recognize six specification for his methodology. The first is Friedman&#039; theory which is a complex ‎intermixture of two elements; language and substantive hypothesis. The second is Friedman&#039; ‎experiment, which is in fact an indirect testing of a theoretical prediction by experimental ‎evidences. So the validity of a theory depends on its power or prediction, not the truth of its ‎assumptions. The third is Friedman&#039;s unrealisticness that allows substantial hypotheses to capture ‎useful aspects of reality not the whole. The forth is the Marshallian approach of Friedman in ‎Economics versus the Walrasian, which lets him to build the economic model problem specific. The ‎fifth is Friedman&#039;s statistical approach. He believes that the only way that economists can come up ‎with a consensus is to use statistics and probabilities. The sixth is Friedman&#039;s causality. He believes ‎that the concepts of cause and effect are ambiguous, instead, we should use endogenous and ‎exogenous concepts in economic models. ‎</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Positive Economics"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Normative Economics"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Theory Experiment"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Unrealisticness"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"As if"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Milton Friedman"</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5234_6f8ae28aad9ac74f55e81c29ea505c14.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Philosophy of Finance</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Philosophy of Finance</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>55</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>77</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5215</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5215</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Moslem</FirstName>
					<LastName>Peymany</LastName>
<Affiliation>Finance and Banking Department, Faculty of Management and Accounting, Allameh Tabataba&amp;#039;i University.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-4003-8295</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>10</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In this paper, a general overview of philosophy of finance was searched and discussed as one of the topics in the philosophy of science and its importance was analyzed. In this regard, some of the issues raised in finance were examined from three aspects of ontology, epistemology and methodology, according to which, first of all, both finance and its categories, despite the claim of realism, face two issues of objectivity and generalization. Second, financial theories are largely positivist and generally functionalist approaches, both of which have cognitive limitations for this branch of science. Also, although there is evidence of paradigm shift and a Cohen’s scientific revolution in finance with the advent of behavioral finance, it may be a bit hasty to confirm this because of its short lifespan, but the development of financial theories is consistent with Lakatosh&#039;s research programs. Finally, the role of ethics in finance was discussed and the need to pay more attention to the goals in finance was pointed out.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">In this paper, a general overview of philosophy of finance was searched and discussed as one of the topics in the philosophy of science and its importance was analyzed. In this regard, some of the issues raised in finance were examined from three aspects of ontology, epistemology and methodology, according to which, first of all, both finance and its categories, despite the claim of realism, face two issues of objectivity and generalization. Second, financial theories are largely positivist and generally functionalist approaches, both of which have cognitive limitations for this branch of science. Also, although there is evidence of paradigm shift and a Cohen’s scientific revolution in finance with the advent of behavioral finance, it may be a bit hasty to confirm this because of its short lifespan, but the development of financial theories is consistent with Lakatosh&#039;s research programs. Finally, the role of ethics in finance was discussed and the need to pay more attention to the goals in finance was pointed out.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Finance</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Ontology</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Epistemology</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">methodology</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Ethics</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5215_a3514cc3497f18accea1d8133aa4c49b.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Reconstruct Heidegger&#039;s philosophy around the concept of &quot;Gestell&quot;</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Reconstruct Heidegger&#039;s philosophy around the concept of &quot;Gestell&quot;</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>79</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>103</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5212</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5212</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mohammad Ali</FirstName>
					<LastName>Roozbahani</LastName>
<Affiliation>student of Philosophy of Science and technology, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Moinzadeh</LastName>
<Affiliation>Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2019</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>25</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Martin Heidegger&#039;s idea is a whole interconnected and the universality of it can be considered as a &quot;philosophy of technology&quot;. The central concept of Heidegger&#039;s philosophy is Being, concealment and its concealment.&lt;br /&gt; His course of thought begins with a critique of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche and it goes on to try to develop another kind of philosophy.Then, by way of metaphysics, it reaches Gestell.&lt;br /&gt; The &quot; Gestell&quot; absolute a horizon of the concealment of Being as the essence of modern technology, with its semantic synonymy in the sense of perfection and the end of metaphysics.&lt;br /&gt; The present study will reconstruct Heidegger&#039;s thought about the concept of &quot;Gestell&quot; and will show how his totality of thought can be regarded as a philosophy of integrated technology.&lt;br /&gt; As any regional interpretation of his views on technology will require consideration of the whole of his thinking.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Martin Heidegger&#039;s idea is a whole interconnected and the universality of it can be considered as a &quot;philosophy of technology&quot;. The central concept of Heidegger&#039;s philosophy is Being, concealment and its concealment.&lt;br /&gt; His course of thought begins with a critique of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche and it goes on to try to develop another kind of philosophy.Then, by way of metaphysics, it reaches Gestell.&lt;br /&gt; The &quot; Gestell&quot; absolute a horizon of the concealment of Being as the essence of modern technology, with its semantic synonymy in the sense of perfection and the end of metaphysics.&lt;br /&gt; The present study will reconstruct Heidegger&#039;s thought about the concept of &quot;Gestell&quot; and will show how his totality of thought can be regarded as a philosophy of integrated technology.&lt;br /&gt; As any regional interpretation of his views on technology will require consideration of the whole of his thinking.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Martin Heidegger"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Gestell</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">metaphysic"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"philosophy of technology"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">" modern science"</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5212_d7faf88e1bde243d6286dbfd94bd8f73.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Problem of Wave Function Collapse by Conscious Observer in The Light of Mind-Body Theories</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Problem of Wave Function Collapse by Conscious Observer in The Light of Mind-Body Theories</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>105</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>125</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5142</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5142</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Seyyed Hedayat</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sajadi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Science and Technology, Department of Physics Education, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>26</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical analysis of the problem of the wave function collapse by conscious observer, based on the theories of philosophy of mind. According to the approaches to the mind-body relation, the conceptual problems of this issue are examined both in the context of Cartesian Dualism, as well as emergent and epiphenomenal mental properties. It is concluded that by taking the physical and hardware approach to mind, raised the same conceptual difficulties of apparatuses in Quantum Mechanics, as well as mental and nonphysical approaches have the problem of explaining the mechanism of the interaction between the mind or mental properties and the observed physical system belongs to the external world. Also, by putting forward a thought experiment as well as by further discussions on the similarities between the &quot;wave function collapse&quot; and processes of &quot;making decision&quot; by a conscious observer, their conceptual consequences for quantum mechanics are examined. Finally, it is shown that each aspect of the problem has its own conceptual difficulties, and this issue will remain open under the mind-matter problem.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical analysis of the problem of the wave function collapse by conscious observer, based on the theories of philosophy of mind. According to the approaches to the mind-body relation, the conceptual problems of this issue are examined both in the context of Cartesian Dualism, as well as emergent and epiphenomenal mental properties. It is concluded that by taking the physical and hardware approach to mind, raised the same conceptual difficulties of apparatuses in Quantum Mechanics, as well as mental and nonphysical approaches have the problem of explaining the mechanism of the interaction between the mind or mental properties and the observed physical system belongs to the external world. Also, by putting forward a thought experiment as well as by further discussions on the similarities between the &quot;wave function collapse&quot; and processes of &quot;making decision&quot; by a conscious observer, their conceptual consequences for quantum mechanics are examined. Finally, it is shown that each aspect of the problem has its own conceptual difficulties, and this issue will remain open under the mind-matter problem.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Quantum Mechanics"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Philosophy of Mind"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Measurement Problem"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Wave Function Collapse"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Mind"</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">"Consciousness"</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5142_99ddc735a755ae61a7e3c341abb08611.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>What does it mean for a scientist to have good sense?</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>What does it mean for a scientist to have good sense?</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>127</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>148</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5141</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5141</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mohammad Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sadrforati</LastName>
<Affiliation>The Faculty of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0003-4145-4554</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Shadi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Mohammadi</LastName>
<Affiliation>University of Amirkabir</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>14</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Having ‘good sense’ in choosing among rival scientific theories was initially introduced by Pierre Duhem. According to him, where empirical evidence and logical rules cannot help to choose among scientific options, scientists need a further criterion to help them decide. However, Duhem left this notion undeveloped and open for further discussions to find its nature and the way it works. This paper starts with evaluating David Stump’s and Milena Ivanova’s accounts, two major scholars in this debate. Having considered the cons and pros of each account, we will come up with a social understanding of ‘good sense’, according to which this notion is characterized by the way successful scientists actually theorize and practice science and the community of scientists accepts them.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Having ‘good sense’ in choosing among rival scientific theories was initially introduced by Pierre Duhem. According to him, where empirical evidence and logical rules cannot help to choose among scientific options, scientists need a further criterion to help them decide. However, Duhem left this notion undeveloped and open for further discussions to find its nature and the way it works. This paper starts with evaluating David Stump’s and Milena Ivanova’s accounts, two major scholars in this debate. Having considered the cons and pros of each account, we will come up with a social understanding of ‘good sense’, according to which this notion is characterized by the way successful scientists actually theorize and practice science and the community of scientists accepts them.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Good sense</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Duhem</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Theory choose</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Social acceptance</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Epistemology</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5141_7ad15db1eaad9742f80df69076473ccd.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Habermas and Quasi-transcendental Foundations of Knowledge</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Habermas and Quasi-transcendental Foundations of Knowledge</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>149</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>170</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5222</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5222</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Esfandiar</FirstName>
					<LastName>Ghafari Nasab</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, Shiraz University</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Ali</FirstName>
					<LastName>Akbari</LastName>
<Affiliation>PhD student of Sociology of Economic Tendency and Development of Shiraz University</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Ali Asghar</FirstName>
					<LastName>Nazari</LastName>
<Affiliation>Master of Philosophy of Social Sciences, University of Tehran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2019</Year>
					<Month>10</Month>
					<Day>19</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The present study will investigate some thoughts of Habermas, German sociologist and philosopher, which in Persian texts, less attention has been paid to it. One of the main aims of his research program has been approximating knowledge and life or Life-world, and this article attempts to present a systematic review of this effort of Habermas and his intellectual confrontations with other philosophical-social disciplines. The concept “Quasi-transcendental” plays a key role in this regard and it converts the Cartesian knowledge from the transcendental subject into a historical process arisen from the practical necessities. Therefore, this article has tried to clarify the meaning, roots, and functions of this concept. Accordingly, two books have a crucial stall: Knowledge and Human Interests and The Theory of Communicative Action. The findings show that: 1. the questions that Habermas in his book seek to answers in fact are the questions of Kant: (the common conditions of recognition possibility) 2. Quasi-transcendental interests are rooted in human life, which is a fundamental change in critical theories. 3. Habermas&#039;s epistemology seeks to revive the values of enlightenment and liberation from domination. 4. Habermas enters into debate with other intellectual disciplines through the formation of cognitive interests (transcendence of the Frankfurt School, a critique of postmodernism, and other philosophical disciplines).</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The present study will investigate some thoughts of Habermas, German sociologist and philosopher, which in Persian texts, less attention has been paid to it. One of the main aims of his research program has been approximating knowledge and life or Life-world, and this article attempts to present a systematic review of this effort of Habermas and his intellectual confrontations with other philosophical-social disciplines. The concept “Quasi-transcendental” plays a key role in this regard and it converts the Cartesian knowledge from the transcendental subject into a historical process arisen from the practical necessities. Therefore, this article has tried to clarify the meaning, roots, and functions of this concept. Accordingly, two books have a crucial stall: Knowledge and Human Interests and The Theory of Communicative Action. The findings show that: 1. the questions that Habermas in his book seek to answers in fact are the questions of Kant: (the common conditions of recognition possibility) 2. Quasi-transcendental interests are rooted in human life, which is a fundamental change in critical theories. 3. Habermas&#039;s epistemology seeks to revive the values of enlightenment and liberation from domination. 4. Habermas enters into debate with other intellectual disciplines through the formation of cognitive interests (transcendence of the Frankfurt School, a critique of postmodernism, and other philosophical disciplines).</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">subject</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Quasi-transcendental</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Kant</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Knowledge</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Habermas</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5222_7d1e84ff755ab2c252578f08fb1b1ec8.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Thermodynamic Asymmetry of Time and Past Hypothesis for the Early Universe</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Thermodynamic Asymmetry of Time and Past Hypothesis for the Early Universe</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>171</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>193</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5139</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5139</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Narges</FirstName>
					<LastName>Fathalian</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Faculty member, PayameNour University

Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Alireza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Mansouri</LastName>
<Affiliation>Institute for Humanities and Cultural studies</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>01</Month>
					<Day>25</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Based on everyday experience and conventional understanding, there seems to be a difference between the past and the future, which we call the &quot;arrow of time.&quot; There are different explanations for the time arrow, one of them is the thermodynamic arrow. However, the fundamental laws of physics, in particular Newton&#039;s laws and statistical mechanics, which we expect to explain the phenomenological laws of thermodynamics, do not show the asymmetry. Boltzmann tried to explain the thermodynamic asymmetry by proposing a &quot;past hypothesis&quot; for the early universe. According to this hypothesis, the early universe was in very special initial conditions. But this proposal encountered with many criticisms. While presenting the philosophical dimensions of the &quot;arrow of time&quot; problem and the critiques of the &quot;past hypothesis&quot;, we argue that the assumption of a fundamental &quot;time arrow&quot; assumes that the past hypothesis alone is not sufficient to explain it. And there is a need for a more fundamental explanation that may change our view of space-time structure.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Based on everyday experience and conventional understanding, there seems to be a difference between the past and the future, which we call the &quot;arrow of time.&quot; There are different explanations for the time arrow, one of them is the thermodynamic arrow. However, the fundamental laws of physics, in particular Newton&#039;s laws and statistical mechanics, which we expect to explain the phenomenological laws of thermodynamics, do not show the asymmetry. Boltzmann tried to explain the thermodynamic asymmetry by proposing a &quot;past hypothesis&quot; for the early universe. According to this hypothesis, the early universe was in very special initial conditions. But this proposal encountered with many criticisms. While presenting the philosophical dimensions of the &quot;arrow of time&quot; problem and the critiques of the &quot;past hypothesis&quot;, we argue that the assumption of a fundamental &quot;time arrow&quot; assumes that the past hypothesis alone is not sufficient to explain it. And there is a need for a more fundamental explanation that may change our view of space-time structure.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Philosophy of physics</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Thermodynamic arrow of time</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Past hypothesis</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Early universe</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Space-time structure</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5139_8c2d4ff746db2fe8c15499da0f24510c.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>comparison Physicalism &amp; Russellian Monism Based on Zombie Argument</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>comparison Physicalism &amp; Russellian Monism Based on Zombie Argument</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>195</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>213</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5214</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5214</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hadi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Ghahar</LastName>
<Affiliation>Dep. Philosophy of Mind
IRICSS</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>01</Month>
					<Day>08</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>یگانه‏انگاری راسلی، عنوان یکی از جدیدترین نظریه‏های فلسفه ذهن است. این نظریه مدعی غلبه بر مشکلات نظریه‏های فیزیکی‏انگار و دوگانه‏انگار است. به طور خاص مشکل عمده فیزیکی‏انگاری، تبیین آگاهی پدیداری است. یکی از مهم‏ترین استدلال‏های موجود علیه فیزیکی‏انگاری استدلال زامبی یا استدلال تصورپذیری است. یگانه‏انگاری راسلی بر اساس یک فهم هستی‏شناسانه متفاوت از عالم، مدعی است ویژگی‏های درونی (ذاتی) اشیاء فیزیکی که تاکنون مورد غفلت نظریه‏های فیزیکی واقع شده‏اند، منشاء ظهور آگاهی پدیداری است. بر این اساس، یگانه‏انگاری راسلی مدعی ارائه تبیینی مناسب از آگاهی پدیداری است که با عالم فیزیکی، یکپارچه است. در این مقاله، پس از تقریر دو نظریه فیزیکی‏انگاری و یگانه‏انگاری راسلی، نسبت آن دو تا‏اندازه‏ای روشن می‏شود و نشان داده می‏شود که تبیین‏های فعلی نظریه یگانه‏انگاری راسلی برای مرزبندی آن با فیزیکی‏انگاری کافی نیست. همچنین بیان خواهد شد که استدلال تصورپذیری که علیه فیزیکی‏انگاری طرح شده است علیه یگانه‏انگاری راسلی (اگر آن را فیزیکی‏انگار قلمداد کنیم) کار نمی‏کند.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">یگانه‏انگاری راسلی، عنوان یکی از جدیدترین نظریه‏های فلسفه ذهن است. این نظریه مدعی غلبه بر مشکلات نظریه‏های فیزیکی‏انگار و دوگانه‏انگار است. به طور خاص مشکل عمده فیزیکی‏انگاری، تبیین آگاهی پدیداری است. یکی از مهم‏ترین استدلال‏های موجود علیه فیزیکی‏انگاری استدلال زامبی یا استدلال تصورپذیری است. یگانه‏انگاری راسلی بر اساس یک فهم هستی‏شناسانه متفاوت از عالم، مدعی است ویژگی‏های درونی (ذاتی) اشیاء فیزیکی که تاکنون مورد غفلت نظریه‏های فیزیکی واقع شده‏اند، منشاء ظهور آگاهی پدیداری است. بر این اساس، یگانه‏انگاری راسلی مدعی ارائه تبیینی مناسب از آگاهی پدیداری است که با عالم فیزیکی، یکپارچه است. در این مقاله، پس از تقریر دو نظریه فیزیکی‏انگاری و یگانه‏انگاری راسلی، نسبت آن دو تا‏اندازه‏ای روشن می‏شود و نشان داده می‏شود که تبیین‏های فعلی نظریه یگانه‏انگاری راسلی برای مرزبندی آن با فیزیکی‏انگاری کافی نیست. همچنین بیان خواهد شد که استدلال تصورپذیری که علیه فیزیکی‏انگاری طرح شده است علیه یگانه‏انگاری راسلی (اگر آن را فیزیکی‏انگار قلمداد کنیم) کار نمی‏کند.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Russellian Monism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Phisicalism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Phenomenal</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Pansychism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Conceivability Argument</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5214_b061ed1531852c8485a8211437ef9767.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Mutual Shaping of Society and Technology; Historical Typewriter Case Study</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Mutual Shaping of Society and Technology; Historical Typewriter Case Study</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>215</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>235</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5140</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5140</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahdi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Kafaee</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Faculty of Electrical and Robotics Engineering, Shahroud University, Shahrood, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Elahe</FirstName>
					<LastName>Daviran</LastName>
<Affiliation>Department of Medical Engineering, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, shahrood university of technology. Shahrood. Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mostafa</FirstName>
					<LastName>Taqavi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Faculty of Philosophy and science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>18</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Society is the origin of technology and its development. On the other hand, technology has special social effects. Generally, the relationship between society and technology is mutual. Awareness of this relationship is necessary for engineering design. Nonetheless, due attention is not paid to this issue in textbooks and teaching procedures. In this paper, the mutual relationship between society and technology is concretely delineated with the typewriter&#039;s historical case study. Sometimes one agent (society or technology) affects another, changes it and then gets affected itself by the resulting change. Also, the effects are not limited to change and an agent can prevent changes in another. In addition, it is observed that in the co-constructing path of agents, rationality is not the only criterion for technological development and is not justifying the phenomena. For example, optimization of technology can be stopped or deviated by society or social agents.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Society is the origin of technology and its development. On the other hand, technology has special social effects. Generally, the relationship between society and technology is mutual. Awareness of this relationship is necessary for engineering design. Nonetheless, due attention is not paid to this issue in textbooks and teaching procedures. In this paper, the mutual relationship between society and technology is concretely delineated with the typewriter&#039;s historical case study. Sometimes one agent (society or technology) affects another, changes it and then gets affected itself by the resulting change. Also, the effects are not limited to change and an agent can prevent changes in another. In addition, it is observed that in the co-constructing path of agents, rationality is not the only criterion for technological development and is not justifying the phenomena. For example, optimization of technology can be stopped or deviated by society or social agents.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Typewriter</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Technology</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">society</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Shaping</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Co-construction</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5140_2085b638e60c32d14028e72c3827ae3a.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The role of analogy and model in theories of cultural evolution: The case of memetics</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The role of analogy and model in theories of cultural evolution: The case of memetics</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>237</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>257</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5138</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5138</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hadi</FirstName>
					<LastName>Samadi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Department of philosophy, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000000268985606</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Ahmad Reza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Moradian</LastName>
<Affiliation>Education</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2019</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>25</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Disparate and competitive theories have been proposed to explain cultural evolution, which one of the most known ones is the Memetic theory. Present article claims that proposed theories such as Memetics represent part of the culture to make them discernible by using analogies. It should be noted that any model including Memetic has been generated by abstraction and idealization and these models are not also necessary in the form of propositions, hence one should not expect such theories to be true. Two reasons are noted in this regard. Firstly, idealization is associated with distance from the truth. Secondly, only propositions are truth-bearer. In the present article, Memetics has been selected from the theories of cultural evolution as a case study, which has been tried to introduce the critiques of its opponents and rejoinders of its defenders. As a result, it is highlighted that culture is highly complex to be lonely explained by an explanatory model. Moreover, no model including Memetics could however, lonely claim for exclusive explanation of culture and the combination of a set of explanatory patterns would pave the way for a better understanding of it.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Disparate and competitive theories have been proposed to explain cultural evolution, which one of the most known ones is the Memetic theory. Present article claims that proposed theories such as Memetics represent part of the culture to make them discernible by using analogies. It should be noted that any model including Memetic has been generated by abstraction and idealization and these models are not also necessary in the form of propositions, hence one should not expect such theories to be true. Two reasons are noted in this regard. Firstly, idealization is associated with distance from the truth. Secondly, only propositions are truth-bearer. In the present article, Memetics has been selected from the theories of cultural evolution as a case study, which has been tried to introduce the critiques of its opponents and rejoinders of its defenders. As a result, it is highlighted that culture is highly complex to be lonely explained by an explanatory model. Moreover, no model including Memetics could however, lonely claim for exclusive explanation of culture and the combination of a set of explanatory patterns would pave the way for a better understanding of it.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">cultural evolution</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">meme</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">memetic</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Model</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">analogy</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5138_d227ab8e09aa38f86b206ebb00577cb2.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>IHCS</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophy of Science</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-0722</Issn>
				<Volume>10</Volume>
				<Issue>19</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The nature of &quot;causality&quot; in the non-rational form of cognition based on the approach of Ernst Cassirer</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The nature of &quot;causality&quot; in the non-rational form of cognition based on the approach of Ernst Cassirer</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>259</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>280</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">5216</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30465/ps.2020.5216</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Majid Reza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Moghanipour</LastName>
<Affiliation>Department of Art , Faculty of Art &amp;amp;amp; Architecture,  Shiraz University, Shiraz,Iran</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-9806-6953</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>07</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>&quot;Causality&quot; is one of the concepts that has a long history in philosophy and human cognition. from the very beginning of human life, man wanted to discover the reason and cause of phenomena; this concept has gone through many ups and downs in the history of philosophical thought. The answers given to the cause of phenomena have been entirely influenced by the type of human consciousness and cognition in different historical and geographical areas; the knowledge and cognitions that thinkers such as Ernest Cassirer believed were not consistently logical. They were not always had a rational patterns, and irrational patterns were involved in shaping human cognitive forms; It is referred to as the &quot;mythical knowledge.&quot;The purpose of writing this article is to introduce the types of causal relationships in this most irrational form of human cognition, based on which, based on the basics, rules and other sources of information in this awareness, to review, describe and analyze The types of causal relationships are discussed in this cognitive form.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">&quot;Causality&quot; is one of the concepts that has a long history in philosophy and human cognition. from the very beginning of human life, man wanted to discover the reason and cause of phenomena; this concept has gone through many ups and downs in the history of philosophical thought. The answers given to the cause of phenomena have been entirely influenced by the type of human consciousness and cognition in different historical and geographical areas; the knowledge and cognitions that thinkers such as Ernest Cassirer believed were not consistently logical. They were not always had a rational patterns, and irrational patterns were involved in shaping human cognitive forms; It is referred to as the &quot;mythical knowledge.&quot;The purpose of writing this article is to introduce the types of causal relationships in this most irrational form of human cognition, based on which, based on the basics, rules and other sources of information in this awareness, to review, describe and analyze The types of causal relationships are discussed in this cognitive form.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Causality</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Ernest Casier</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Mythical knowledge</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">cognition</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">myth</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">http://philosophy.ihcs.ac.ir/article_5216_64987f4cc76df87a9ef1ae3d3cb96eac.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
</ArticleSet>
