Javad Akbari
Volume 1, Issue 1 , Summer and Autumn 2011, , Pages 1-35
Abstract
Habermas is a theorist who is active in the framework of critical theory and he has, in his intellectual life, combated against different dominations, particularly against the intellectual domination which intangibly dominates people. Among his most important goals in his methodology and philosophy was ...
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Habermas is a theorist who is active in the framework of critical theory and he has, in his intellectual life, combated against different dominations, particularly against the intellectual domination which intangibly dominates people. Among his most important goals in his methodology and philosophy was critique of scientism and positivistic attitude that were trying to spread quantitative and technological views in all facets of human life. Habermas for this purpose developed and analyzed the doctrine of "knowledge-constitutive interest". In the next period of his intellectual life, he introduced the theory of "Communicative rationality" to make transparent his philosophy, and thereby to give emphasis on the efficiency of reason in the mutual understanding pattern. Habermas renewed his previous ideas, such as his theory of truth, to overcome criticisms against him. The aforementioned points are discussed in this article along with his important epistemological and philosophical views.
Omid Ahanchi; Mohammad Saeedimehr
Volume 1, Issue 2 , Winter and Spring 2012, , Pages 1-23
Abstract
The concept of temperament is one of the key concepts which has played an important role in, ancient medicine and physics on the one hand, and in the philosophical discussions in particular in the field of knowledge of the soul on the other. According to the ancients, temperament is a quality resulted ...
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The concept of temperament is one of the key concepts which has played an important role in, ancient medicine and physics on the one hand, and in the philosophical discussions in particular in the field of knowledge of the soul on the other. According to the ancients, temperament is a quality resulted from reaction between four elements and is, in terms of its characteristics, other than its components. The resulted quality is at different levels of balance and that how much the resulted quality (temperament) is at balance is an important agent for beings to attain different levels of existence. May such a concept have some place in the modern medicine as well? To reply, at first, we define temperament as well as the concept related to it such as balance of temperament, four elements, and four-fold humors as viewed by the ancients. Then, we introduce four popular contemporary understandings of temperament and, after it and based on the true understanding of temperament, we will select from among the above four ones. In this understanding, the quality of functions of autonomous nervous system may be taken as a contemporary alternative for the traditional; concept of temperament.
Keyvan Alasti
Volume 2, Issue 3 , Summer and Autumn 2012, , Pages 1-22
Abstract
According to Hilary Putnam, two different levels of empirical investigations regarding natural kinds are available: discovering essence and distinguishing genuine samples from fake ones. Recently, Joseph LaPorte has presented a dilemma in naming natural kinds. He showed that for any kind there are some ...
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According to Hilary Putnam, two different levels of empirical investigations regarding natural kinds are available: discovering essence and distinguishing genuine samples from fake ones. Recently, Joseph LaPorte has presented a dilemma in naming natural kinds. He showed that for any kind there are some vague samples which scientists cannot decide whether take them as an unknown variation of the kind or not to consider them as extensions of that kind. On the one hand, discovering the kind’s essence is possible for scientists only when they recognize the range of differences between kind’s variations; and on the other hand, they can distinguish different kind variations only when they know the kind’s essence. Here, LaPorte has presented his own solution. According to him, the kind's essence is not discovered but stipulated. In this essay we shall try to present an alternative solution in which discovering an essence is possible.
Jafar Aghayani Chavoshi
Volume 2, Issue 4 , Winter and Spring 2013, , Pages 1-24
Abstract
Mohammad ibn Musa Khawrazmi, one of the most famous mathematicians of Iran in the 9th century, invented a new science which is called today ‘algebra’. Thanks this science he could solve all the quadratic equations of his time. In fact, he developed a theory for systematically solving quadratic ...
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Mohammad ibn Musa Khawrazmi, one of the most famous mathematicians of Iran in the 9th century, invented a new science which is called today ‘algebra’. Thanks this science he could solve all the quadratic equations of his time. In fact, he developed a theory for systematically solving quadratic equations. In this theory, he distinguished firstly the five types of algebraic equations.
Secondly, he gave the algorithms to solve these equations. Thirdly, he gave the geometrical proofs for these solutions. Indeed, Khawrazmi went beyond merely providing the sort of algebraic recipes found in Babylonian texts,by insisting in further adding geometrical proofs for algebraic facts.
Khawrazmi's contribution and influence are tremendous .In 1140 Robert of Chester translated Khawrazmi's book into Latin as ‘Liber algebrae et almucabala’. When Khawrazmi's work became known in Europe through Latin translation his influence made indelible mark on the development of mathematics in the West especially in Italy. For example, Cardano, an italian mathematician, opened his ‘Ars magna’ with a brief historical passage in which he first traced his intellectual lineage from Khawrazmi through Fibonacci to Pacioli and then outlined the sixteenth century developments on the solution of the cubic equation.
Jalal Peykani
Volume 3, Issue 5 , Summer and Autumn 2013, , Pages 1-21
Abstract
The classical problem of induction is one of the very known forms of Skepticism, which many philosophers have tried to solve or resolve it. Some epistemologists believe that Externalism could be used as a good approach to resolve the problem. They claim that ‘Process reliabilism’, the most ...
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The classical problem of induction is one of the very known forms of Skepticism, which many philosophers have tried to solve or resolve it. Some epistemologists believe that Externalism could be used as a good approach to resolve the problem. They claim that ‘Process reliabilism’, the most important externalist theory, is less vulnerable to Skepticism than other theories, because of its epistemological fallibilism, and also taking modest and weak criteria to acquire knowledge. In this paper we will argue that externalist theories, including Process reliabilism, presuppose induction, so such theories don’t have considerable capabilities to solve or resolve the problem.
Mohadese Borhani nejad; Hossein Valeh
Abstract
Popper believed that Heisenberg misinterpreted the theory of indeterminism, since the limits of attainable precision asserted by Heisenberg is not a logical consequence of the formula of the theory but rather, a separate and additional assumption. Popper believed that Heisenberg’s explanation of ...
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Popper believed that Heisenberg misinterpreted the theory of indeterminism, since the limits of attainable precision asserted by Heisenberg is not a logical consequence of the formula of the theory but rather, a separate and additional assumption. Popper believed that Heisenberg’s explanation of uncertainty principle includes metaphysical elements rendering it non-falsifiable. By proposing ‘statistical scatter’, Popper offered a new interpretation of uncertainty principle in order to show this additional assumption, prove that the possibility of observations more exact than what Heisenberg thought, is consisted with the formulae, and if formula of quantum be statistically interpreted, the additional metaphysical assumption actually contradicts them.
Soghra Babapour; Jafar Shanazari; Mehdi Dehbashi
Volume 4, Issue 7 , Summer and Autumn 2014, , Pages 1-20
Abstract
should be corresponded to the reality, in Mullasadra’s view the correspondence and non-correspondence is an acquired knowledge. He believes that essence is the intermediary between subject and object, which has the same existence in the both sides. The drawbacks of the theory indicate that he could ...
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should be corresponded to the reality, in Mullasadra’s view the correspondence and non-correspondence is an acquired knowledge. He believes that essence is the intermediary between subject and object, which has the same existence in the both sides. The drawbacks of the theory indicate that he could not demonstrate the correspondence between subject and object. Besides, according to the priority of existence and the gradation of existence, one can propose the sameness of objective existence theory, according to which knowledge is the higher existence of known essence.
Hossein Bayat; musa akrami
Volume 4, Issue 8 , Winter and Spring 2015, , Pages 1-18
Abstract
The extension of the mathematical argumentation methods, in recent decades, has led to an essential critique of classic definition of mathematical proof. The critics often have suggested alternative definitions, which have different and sometimes incompatible presuppositions and implications. Such a ...
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The extension of the mathematical argumentation methods, in recent decades, has led to an essential critique of classic definition of mathematical proof. The critics often have suggested alternative definitions, which have different and sometimes incompatible presuppositions and implications. Such a situation has exposed mathematics to relativism.
The problem of multiplicity of definitions, therefore, can be considered as one of the most important epistemological issues in mathematics. In this paper, we try, from third order or meta-methodological position, to answer this question: ‘what is the meta-criterion for choosing the best definition of mathematical proof?’ by answering this question we will be one step closer to a justified definition of mathematical proof.
The authors will show that the explanatory power meta-criterion, compared to the two other rivals, i.e. the equivalence meta-criterion and the consensus meta-criterion, is more tenable.
Alireza Sobhani; Mehdi Golshani
Volume 5, Issue 9 , Summer and Autumn 2015, , Pages 1-28
Abstract
In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable ...
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In this paper two viewpoints about scientific theories will be introduced. These two viewpoints are: 1- received view and 2- semantic view about scientific theories. It should be emphasized that our major focus is on the semantic view to scientific theories. The first one, now, does not have any considerable adherents and mainly logical positivist philosophers were its defenders. The received view has two important problems: 1- it is highly impractical that we want to formalize the scientific theories in the first order logic language and 2- its characterization of role and status of models in the scientific theories is inappropriate. We will notice that the semantic view, in particular the version that da Costa and French introduced, by its use of structure, can dissolve these problems and many problems that this view is involved with and this approach is in agreement with what scientists do in reality, in particular physicists try to model natural phenomena.
Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Eatemad al-Eslami Bakhtiari; Mirsaeid Mousavi Karimi
Volume 5, Issue 10 , Winter and Spring 2016, , Pages 1-20
Abstract
Some philosophers believe that natural selection guarantees the reliability of belief formation processes. From their point of view, belief formation processes that lead to true beliefs more than false ones are useful for organism reproduction and survival, and so are saved by natural selection. However, ...
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Some philosophers believe that natural selection guarantees the reliability of belief formation processes. From their point of view, belief formation processes that lead to true beliefs more than false ones are useful for organism reproduction and survival, and so are saved by natural selection. However, Stephen Stich’s argument, called “better safe than sorry”, shows that natural selection is not sufficient for the reliability of belief formation processes. Criticizing this argument, Cristopher L. Stephen has proposed a model that identifies situations in which natural selection supports true beliefs. He claims that the model limits Stich’s argument scope. In this article we argue that Stephens’ model is unable to limit Stich’s argument scope and has no essential determining role in the challenge of evolutionary based explanation between opponents and proponents for the reliability of belief formation processes.
Javad Akbari; Mehdi Golshani
Volume 6, Issue 11 , Summer and Autumn 2016, , Pages 1-36
Abstract
Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered ...
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Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen, the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and, in this case, he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism
mostafa taghavi
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Winter and Spring 2017, , Pages 1-14
Abstract
In the first of this three-part article, Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory of knowledge is briefly introduced. Here I explain why he is opposed to logical positivism, Popper’s philosophy of science, Lakatos and even Kuhn, and why he believes that science is not superior to other cognitive traditions. ...
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In the first of this three-part article, Feyerabend’s anarchistic theory of knowledge is briefly introduced. Here I explain why he is opposed to logical positivism, Popper’s philosophy of science, Lakatos and even Kuhn, and why he believes that science is not superior to other cognitive traditions. Feyerabend emphasizes that ‘Anything goes’ is the only undying principle that can be derived from real science. The first part of the article paves the way for the clarification of the meaning of this key sentence in the third section. In fact, the first part should be considered as a representation of Feyerabend’s anarchistic thoughts. The second part, which presents the main idea of the article, explains that Feyerabend's anarchistic theory has its roots in his view on ‘being’, ‘man’ and ‘theory’. These three categories are closely interrelated: Man develops theories through which understands being. The second part, which describes the background of Feyerabend's anarchist theory, also indicates that the origins of his philosophy are not so much anarchistic. In the final part, some of the most important corollaries of Feyerabend’s thoughts such as ‘proliferation and tenacity’, ‘free society’ and ‘the difference between the respectable thinkers and inferior ones’ will be addressed.
saide bagheri; Shahin Iravani; Khosrow Bagheri NoaParast; Mohammd Reza Sharafi
Volume 7, Issue 13 , Summer and Autumn 2017, , Pages 1-22
Abstract
This study consists of three parts: reviewing approaches in philosophy of science; presenting Mary Hesse’s hermeneutic approach and, finally, extracting Hesse's view on the understanding of scientific concepts. In order to clarify Hesse’s approach, we, in the first part, review the post-positivistic ...
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This study consists of three parts: reviewing approaches in philosophy of science; presenting Mary Hesse’s hermeneutic approach and, finally, extracting Hesse's view on the understanding of scientific concepts. In order to clarify Hesse’s approach, we, in the first part, review the post-positivistic space of philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century. In the second section, the models Hesse has proposed to explain the mechanism of science advancement and scientific theories are described. Emphasizing the explanatory function of metaphor in scientific theories, suggesting minimalistic realism as a requirement for scientific activity, and explaining the dual objectivity for science, are among the achievements of Hesse's view in philosophy of science. Scientific concepts have a certain place in Hesse's discussions, and it can be argued that, in Hessian approach, scientific concepts are historical and theoretical and can be used as metaphors in the metaphorical language of science. Finally, people's understanding of scientific concepts would be different according to the characteristics of the concepts. Also peoples’ understanding of scientific concepts is dynamic due to the dynamics of the language of science
Hassan Amiriara; Amirehsan Karbasizadeh
Volume 7, Issue 14 , Winter and Spring 2018, , Pages 1-25
Abstract
1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static ...
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1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static model by assuming the STR. By virtue of the STR, he assumed that the relation of simultaneity between events is a non-transitive relation. For this reason, some philosophers (e.g. Bourn 2006 and Craig 2008) have tried to defend the Dynamic model through defending a privilege frame of reference (and so, a transitive relation of simultaneity) in relativistic setting. In this paper, by distinguishing between weak static model and strong static model I will try to argue that why assuming a privileged frame of reference, even if exists, could not have any advantage for advocates of the dynamic m
Banafsheh Eftekhari
Volume 8, Issue 15 , Summer and Autumn 2018, , Pages 1-26
Abstract
Kalām Atomism defended by Ash’arī and Mu’tazila both, also includes the geometrical Atomism. Geometrical Atomism considers lines and geometrical shapes consisting of indivisible things. In other words, from this view, line is made up of points. This view conflicts with the definitions in ...
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Kalām Atomism defended by Ash’arī and Mu’tazila both, also includes the geometrical Atomism. Geometrical Atomism considers lines and geometrical shapes consisting of indivisible things. In other words, from this view, line is made up of points. This view conflicts with the definitions in Euclid’s Elements and subsequently classical geometry. Fakhr al-Din Razi who defended Atomism in the last decades of his lifespan was aware of this inconsistency. Through the arguments relevant to Atomism, he tried to resolve the inconsistency. Although his efforts do not result in developing a new geometry consistent with Atomism, his arguments contain subtle points which are significant from the view of the history and philosophy of Mathematics. In this paper, I will investigate several arguments from al-Maṭālib al-‘Alīyah in modern mathematical notation. And I will analyze the theoretical background of the arguments to achieve a frame to see their significance from the history of mathematics point of view. It is to show how Razi examined another geometrical structure other than the classical Geometry of his age. Furthermore, I suggest that Razi’s arguments should be considered in the history of infinitesimals as a possibility
sayyed mahdi biabanaki
Volume 8, Issue 16 , Winter and Spring 2019, , Pages 1-17
Abstract
Scientific naturalism is a doctrine that consists of two ontological and methodological components. On the basis of the methodological component, the scientific method is the only source for validation (about nature), and based on the ontological component, all that exists (causation) can be investigated ...
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Scientific naturalism is a doctrine that consists of two ontological and methodological components. On the basis of the methodological component, the scientific method is the only source for validation (about nature), and based on the ontological component, all that exists (causation) can be investigated by science. Some naturalist philosophers believe that the ontological component, that is, ontological (or metaphysical) natureism, is an essential or structural philosophy for science, in the sense that if science is eliminated from metaphysics, then what is obtained will no longer be science. In contrast, many naturalist critics believe that ontological naturalism is a lesson outside metaphysics of science, and only methodological naturalism (not a metaphysical principle) is a disciplining or methodological principle for science. In this sense, naturalism is used only as a pragmatic predicate for scientific action of scientists. In this paper, we will show that none of the two approaches are correct in relation to the relation between naturalism and science; and we are not allowed to block the flow of Hwites and supernatural causes into the realm of science, based on a metaphysical or pragmatic default, and the metaphysics of the universe We presuppose nature to science, which is free from such an echo and causation from the beginning.
Banafsheh Eftekhari
Abstract
Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī is a thinker of the 12th century who had a significant role in the dialog between two philosophical doctrines of his age, i.e. Peripateticism and kalām. He followed peripatetic methods to develop kalām theories. Razī’s theory of motion is in the frame of kalām Atomism. ...
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Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī is a thinker of the 12th century who had a significant role in the dialog between two philosophical doctrines of his age, i.e. Peripateticism and kalām. He followed peripatetic methods to develop kalām theories. Razī’s theory of motion is in the frame of kalām Atomism. In this paper, I will show how the atomistic theory of motion is in interaction with Aristotelian fundamentals in Physics. I will show that Razi asserts discontinuity of motion, by relying on Aristotelian Continuity principles and rejecting to some premises. Then, I discuss the significance of this theory from the history of science’s view.
saeedeh Babaii
Abstract
Mankind has turned to technology to solve many of its problems. Although technology has been effective in solving many of these problems, it has also caused some crises. Hence, some philosophers have been reflecting on technology and have examined the cause of technology crises and the ways out of these ...
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Mankind has turned to technology to solve many of its problems. Although technology has been effective in solving many of these problems, it has also caused some crises. Hence, some philosophers have been reflecting on technology and have examined the cause of technology crises and the ways out of these crises. One of these philosophers is the American philosopher, Albert Borgmann. Borgmann proposes his idea of focal things and practices to solve technological crises. This paper examines this idea and its criticisms. Then, we evaluate Borgmann's responses to these criticisms, and finally, by categorizing these criticisms and responses, we identify the gaps in Borgmann's theory
Mohammad Hosein Esfandiari
Abstract
Carnap’s view on ontology had not yet rallied that Quine attacked it; and this has caused a dispute between two philosophers for more than half a century. The question remains: which one was/is right? In this article after reviewing Carnap’s view, I have recounted Quine’s critiques, ...
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Carnap’s view on ontology had not yet rallied that Quine attacked it; and this has caused a dispute between two philosophers for more than half a century. The question remains: which one was/is right? In this article after reviewing Carnap’s view, I have recounted Quine’s critiques, here and there, to his stands under three titles. It is shown how Carnap’s view can be justified from these three critiques. Then, after considering that Quine has identified the position of the difference incorrectly, but not the different position, I have explained, In the midst of arbitration between two philosophers, although Carnap and Quine, both, do maintain ontological relativity, the former believes in ‘general relativity’, and the latter in ‘special relativity’. From another point of view, although two philosopher do maintain ontological skepticism, the former is ‘second level skeptic’, and the latter is ‘first level skeptic’. In the other words. I have shown how in ontological approach of two philosophers “the reason for the agreement is the same for disagreement”. Among these complexities the conclusion is taken that any unilateral arbitration, on strict agreement or disagreement, will be wrong.
Banafsheh Eftekhari
Abstract
The history of atomism has begun from Ancient Greek. Greek atomism was materialist, causal, and Mechanical. Atomism whether the ancient atomism or modern version (after the seventeenth century), is regarded as a materialist theory. In medieval time, in the Islamic world, an atomistic theory was offered ...
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The history of atomism has begun from Ancient Greek. Greek atomism was materialist, causal, and Mechanical. Atomism whether the ancient atomism or modern version (after the seventeenth century), is regarded as a materialist theory. In medieval time, in the Islamic world, an atomistic theory was offered to explain nature by mūtikallimūn, (Muʿtazila and Ašʿarī). Opposite of Greek atomists, Muslim atomists were theists and they were called mūtikallimūn for begin devoted to Islam and Quran. Nonetheless, they have developed a theory that is similar in some aspects to the other atomistic theories; however, they were radical about God’s omnipotence. In this paper, I investigate the metaphysical structure of Kalām atomism in the respect that they are based on which belief, after a brief introduction. And then I analyze that those theist theorists developed a scientific account in physics, which protected their religious beliefs. I examine how the theory results in materialism and the exclusion of metaphysics, but not entailing atheism.
Majid Davoody; Mehdi Nasrin
Volume 3, Issue 6 , Winter and Spring 2014, , Pages 13-36
Abstract
At the outset of the 20th century, the received formulation of empiricism, as it was endorsed in logical empiricism, began to sound problematic, in a way that the system seemed to be in need of some revisions and amendments. Carnap endeavored to fix the gaps by his proposals in his Logical Syntax of ...
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At the outset of the 20th century, the received formulation of empiricism, as it was endorsed in logical empiricism, began to sound problematic, in a way that the system seemed to be in need of some revisions and amendments. Carnap endeavored to fix the gaps by his proposals in his Logical Syntax of Language (1934/37). In spite of some lasting merits, the approach was not left totally uncontroversial; therefore in 1940s Carnap went to do some further revisions in his so called semantic period. In this paper, I will show why the failure of Carnap’s program even in the semantic period does not lead to the total destruction of empiricism.
rasol jafarian; eiraj nikseresht; abdollah farrahi
Volume 6, Issue 2 , Winter and Spring 2017, , Pages 15-36
Abstract
Al-Kindī was the first major product of the transition from theology to philosophy, relying on the works of the Aristotelian school, attempted to provide a defensible worldview against the imported ideas to Islam. He considered the first philosophy as most prominent science and he believed that proof-based ...
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Al-Kindī was the first major product of the transition from theology to philosophy, relying on the works of the Aristotelian school, attempted to provide a defensible worldview against the imported ideas to Islam. He considered the first philosophy as most prominent science and he believed that proof-based sciences provide certainty. Using the concept of ‘invention’ in explaining the beginning of creation, he believed in the theory creation from nothingness, the finiteness of time and place, and, consequently, the contingency of the universe and of what is beyond God. He believed that there were two types of transitional movements: circular and straight; he saw the movement of spheres of the first type and the movement of the four elements of the second type. The theory of four elements in the al-Kindi’s intellectual system, especially in the natural sciences, was of particular importance. This theory was not only of a special focus in the natural sciences, but al-Kindi even tried to extend it to didactic knowledge and to make a relationship between the elements and music. He maintained the centrality of the elements and their characteristics in optics, and considered the existence of non-transparent element of soil as the cause of the different colors in the natural world. He believed that there is a tendency in the elements, from soil to water, of being spherical (the most complete form), and he considered the universe spherical in the middle of which earth is placed, the sphere of constants was the last one and there was nothing beyond it.
ghasem purhasan; Mojtaba Etemadinia
Volume 4, Issue 8 , Winter and Spring 2015, , Pages 19-36
Abstract
Quine’s article in 1951 entitled ‘Tow Dogmas of Empiricism’, based on an unexpected critique of analytic-synthetic distinction, rules against using ‘analyticity’ to explain the necessity and the a priori. Quine refused any attempt to display any distinction between ...
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Quine’s article in 1951 entitled ‘Tow Dogmas of Empiricism’, based on an unexpected critique of analytic-synthetic distinction, rules against using ‘analyticity’ to explain the necessity and the a priori. Quine refused any attempt to display any distinction between analytic and synthetic statements without a vicious circle among them. According to his viewpoint, concepts as ‘synonymy’, ‘contradiction’ and ‘meaning’ which were used in the definition of the analytic statements, aren’t clear enough and there is a vicious circle between them. Quine argues that a holistic attitude toward any ‘individual statement’ entails that all propositions can be in touch, in some way, with the empirical boundary of our belief web. It implies the possibility of revision all statements and consequently the destruction of familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. In this article we first review Quinen’s viewpoint on the rejection of analytic-synthetic distinction and then will examine the main challenges of his critique
Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht; amir ehsan karbasizade
Volume 8, Issue 16 , Winter and Spring 2019, , Pages 19-41
Abstract
The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem ...
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The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem and trying to dissolve it in one way or another). Classical solutions have been proposed by Garber, Jeffery, and Niiniluoto, and have been criticized by many, among them, Eells and Earman. One of the non-classical solutions is to choose an objective (rather than Bayesian’s subjective) interpretation of probability; this view has been proposed by Rosenkrantz. In this paper, we thoroughly examine the classical solutions and objections that have been raised against them, trying to show that the classical approach is deficient. In the end, we try to make a case for Rosenkrantz’s proposal as the only solution which, we believe, gets to the root of the problem correctly
Majid Bidarmaghz; Morteza Sedaghat Ahangari Hossein Zadeh
Volume 4, Issue 7 , Summer and Autumn 2014, , Pages 21-51
Abstract
The view that one's observations are depended on his/her epistemological network and are flexible due to trainings and expectations, is a long-lasting view which has a special place in the philosophy of science. The opposite view says that there is an impenetrable layer in observation which is resistant ...
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The view that one's observations are depended on his/her epistemological network and are flexible due to trainings and expectations, is a long-lasting view which has a special place in the philosophy of science. The opposite view says that there is an impenetrable layer in observation which is resistant to influence of any educational and epistemological structure. In this paper, we first present these views according to Churchland and Fodor, the main figures in the camps respectively. Second, more importantly, we will defend a more moderate view which is based on a graded account of observation. The latter view accepts rigidity in the level of sensation while acknowledges that observation is flexible in higher levels. According to this view there is no need to appeal to flexibility of sensations to explain why there are discrepancies in observational reports and judgments.
