Parisa Saatchi Fard; Keyvan Alasti
Abstract
In all periods of history, human has been trying to "understand". In order to understanding the natural world, scientists first observe samples and then classify them based on similarity. To figure out the actions of people, the matter seems different. To achieve this, we need to understand the intentions ...
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In all periods of history, human has been trying to "understand". In order to understanding the natural world, scientists first observe samples and then classify them based on similarity. To figure out the actions of people, the matter seems different. To achieve this, we need to understand the intentions of people. Because intention has psychological nature, there is always a concern from empiricists that it may not be perceptible by third-person people. To some extent, many human actions are perceptible from a third-person point of view, and this causes them to be the subject of scientific investigations (with common scientific methods). However, there are cases that show the understanding of human activities from the third person of view has limitations.Stephen Grimm introduces a type of understanding and believes that by realising the specific goals of the person being understood as a desired action, we will achieve a deeper understanding. In this article, an attempt has been made to clarify the discussed issue first by proposing and interpreting Stephen Grimm's point of view, and then by proposing the problems and explaining the ambiguities of Grimm's idea, as an alternative formulation, we will show that the agent's decision for understanding or not understanding the actions of others, plays an important role. Empathy is known as a psychological capacity that can be understood in a different way by simulating the structure.Investigating and looking deeper into this issue will help us to judge it better as a method or an idea in social and human sciences.
Emad Tayebi; Alireza Mansouri
Abstract
The ontological problem of technical artifacts is: what makes an object count as a technical artifact? Most theories have investigated the ontology of artifacts in terms of ‘function’. A group of these theories has highlighted the physical structure of the artifact because of its causal role ...
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The ontological problem of technical artifacts is: what makes an object count as a technical artifact? Most theories have investigated the ontology of artifacts in terms of ‘function’. A group of these theories has highlighted the physical structure of the artifact because of its causal role in realizing the function; Others, taking ‘function’ and ‘intention’ the same, have emphasized agents’ intention in the design and use of artifacts. Some have considered the evolution of artifacts, their history of selection and reproduction, to be effective in the constitution of their ontology. Due to the shortcomings of causal, intentional, and evolutionary theories, attempts have been made to present hybrid theories. This paper, along with an overview and evaluation of the most important theories of the ontology of technical artifacts, aims to spell out the problems which any adequate ontology of artifacts needs to answer.
