Javad Akbari Takhtameshlou; Seyed Mehdi Hosseini Nasab
Abstract
Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science—both realist and anti-realist—have shown a special tendency toward the concept of ‘structure’, mainly to address certain problems in the process of understanding science (particularly some serious problems arising ...
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Since the beginning of the 20th century, philosophers of science—both realist and anti-realist—have shown a special tendency toward the concept of ‘structure’, mainly to address certain problems in the process of understanding science (particularly some serious problems arising from successive and deep changes in scientific theories over time). In this regard, different forms of ‘structuralism’ have been developed thus far around the belief that science is only capable of revealing the structure of the world (and not the ontological characteristics of its objects). However, all structuralisms have been subjected to a very serious criticism known as ‘Newman's objection’, which states that if structure is supposed to be the most we know about the world, then the only thing we will actually know about the world is cardinality, i.e., the number of related objects.Given the importance of structuralism in the philosophy of science as well as the seriousness of Newman's objection, the goal of this paper is to introduce both realist and anti-realist scientific structuralism and examine and evaluate how successfully they respond to this criticism. The findings of this examination suggest that both of these structuralisms are incapable or at least substantially problematic in answering Newman's objection, mostly due to their structuralist nature and underlying ideas.
Javad Akbari; Mehdi Golshani
Volume 6, Issue 11 , September 2016, , Pages 1-36
Abstract
Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered ...
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Since the publication of Scientific Image, van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and, instead, introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’, he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen, the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and, in this case, he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism
Mirsaeid Mousavi Karimi; Jahangir Moazenzade
Volume 6, Issue 11 , September 2016, , Pages 127-148
Abstract
Van Fraassen as an empiricist believes that ‘observation’ is perception of something without instruments. On the other hand, as a constructive empiricist, he adds a constraint based on which if something is observable does not automatically imply that its observing conditions are ready now. ...
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Van Fraassen as an empiricist believes that ‘observation’ is perception of something without instruments. On the other hand, as a constructive empiricist, he adds a constraint based on which if something is observable does not automatically imply that its observing conditions are ready now. Considering moons of Jupiter as observable entities and electron as an unobservable entity, he believes that we do not see the ‘electrons’ atomic theory shows us by microscope. Realist critics of van Fraassen without considering mentioned restriction and based on different reasons give examples such as extra solar planets and claim if we count these entities as observable entities we have to count electron as an observable entity as well. However, in this paper, based on the criterion of ‘existence or non-existence of observable reference by naked eye in suitable conditions’, which meet for all of the critic's examples, but does not meet for electron, we will argue, as van Fraassen has claimed, for counting electron as an unobservable entity
