Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht; amir ehsan karbasizade
Volume 8, Issue 16 , Winter and Spring 2019, , Pages 19-41
Abstract
The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem ...
Read More
The problem of old evidence allegedly poses the most serious challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. All proposed solutions to this problem can be divided into two types: classical (treating the challenge as serious and trying to meet it) and non-classical (with denying that there is a real problem and trying to dissolve it in one way or another). Classical solutions have been proposed by Garber, Jeffery, and Niiniluoto, and have been criticized by many, among them, Eells and Earman. One of the non-classical solutions is to choose an objective (rather than Bayesian’s subjective) interpretation of probability; this view has been proposed by Rosenkrantz. In this paper, we thoroughly examine the classical solutions and objections that have been raised against them, trying to show that the classical approach is deficient. In the end, we try to make a case for Rosenkrantz’s proposal as the only solution which, we believe, gets to the root of the problem correctly
Hassan Amiriara; Amirehsan Karbasizadeh
Volume 7, Issue 14 , Winter and Spring 2018, , Pages 1-25
Abstract
1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static ...
Read More
1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static model by assuming the STR. By virtue of the STR, he assumed that the relation of simultaneity between events is a non-transitive relation. For this reason, some philosophers (e.g. Bourn 2006 and Craig 2008) have tried to defend the Dynamic model through defending a privilege frame of reference (and so, a transitive relation of simultaneity) in relativistic setting. In this paper, by distinguishing between weak static model and strong static model I will try to argue that why assuming a privileged frame of reference, even if exists, could not have any advantage for advocates of the dynamic m
