Hassan Amiriara
Abstract
Morganti and Tahko advocate a kind of metaphysics that they call "moderate naturalized metaphysics." This moderate naturalism concerning metaphysics differs crucially with, on the one hand, Ladyman & Ross's radical project of naturalizing metaphysics and, on the other hand, proposals aiming to defend ...
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Morganti and Tahko advocate a kind of metaphysics that they call "moderate naturalized metaphysics." This moderate naturalism concerning metaphysics differs crucially with, on the one hand, Ladyman & Ross's radical project of naturalizing metaphysics and, on the other hand, proposals aiming to defend the autonomy of metaphysics, such as those of Larry Paul and Jonathan Lowe. Morganti and Tahko hold that metaphysics overlaps with natural sciences in terms of subject matter and has a sufficient degree of independence from it in terms of method. In this article, I will outline this naturalistic project, mainly in contrast with the meta-metaphysical views of Ladyman & Ross, Lowe, and Paul. Then I attempt to examine and criticize it, arguing that their project faces two main challenges. First, it cannot suitably address the overlap between metaphysics and science regarding the subject matter. Second, it cannot provide a criterion for limiting and constraining the metaphysical activity based on naturalism.
Hassan Amiriara; Amirehsan Karbasizadeh
Volume 7, Issue 14 , April 2018, , Pages 1-25
Abstract
1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static ...
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1967, “time and physical” geometry, discussion about implications of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) for the debate between Static vs. Dynamic models of temporal reality became serious in contemporary philosophy of time. In this article, Putnam provided an argument in favor of Static model by assuming the STR. By virtue of the STR, he assumed that the relation of simultaneity between events is a non-transitive relation. For this reason, some philosophers (e.g. Bourn 2006 and Craig 2008) have tried to defend the Dynamic model through defending a privilege frame of reference (and so, a transitive relation of simultaneity) in relativistic setting. In this paper, by distinguishing between weak static model and strong static model I will try to argue that why assuming a privileged frame of reference, even if exists, could not have any advantage for advocates of the dynamic m
